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FIREARMS AND INITIAL AGGRESSORS
Cynthia Lee*

ABSTRACT
Under the initial aggressor doctrine, an “initial aggressor” loses the right to
claim self-defense. Until recently, judges, legal scholars, and others have paid
relatively little attention to this doctrinal limitation on the defense of self-defense. Two
high-profile criminal trials in 2021 put the initial aggressor doctrine front and center
of the national conversation on issues concerning self-defense and racial justice. One
involved Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old teenager who brought an AR-15 style
rifle to Kenosha, Wisconsin during the third night of racial protests in August
2020, and ended up shooting three men, killing two and injuring the third. The
other involved the February 2020 shotgun shooting by Travis McMichael of an
unarmed Black man named Ahmaud Arbery as he was jogging in a predominantly
white neighborhood in Satilla Shores, Georgia.
The question of how the display of a firearm in public should factor into a
claim of self-defense has become more important than ever as the nation continues to
relax its restrictions on firearm carrying in public and as criminal homicides by
firearms rise. As laws regarding the carrying of firearms in public—laws on the
front end—become less restrictive, the need to tighten up laws, like the law of selfdefense, that apply on the back end to those who discharge or otherwise use their
firearms in public becomes more pressing. Initial aggressor rules can serve this critical
function and should be reformed accordingly to discourage gun owners from using
their firearms to kill or injure others.
While all fifty states and the District of Columbia have placed some
limitations on an initial aggressor’s ability to justify the use of force in self-defense,
current initial aggressor rules are ambiguous and often contradictory. Most state
statutes do not define the term “aggressor” and no clear rules exist regarding whether
and when an initial aggressor instruction must be given to the jury. This Article
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attempts to strengthen the initial aggressor doctrine so it can help discourage gun
violence. To this end, the Article makes three key contributions to existing legal
scholarship. First, the Article clarifies the morass of confusing initial aggressor rules
that currently exist across the nation. Second, the Article theorizes that one of the
main problems with current initial aggressor doctrine is that it leaves too much
discretion in the hands of the judge, which means the jury—the body that is supposed
to decide whether a defendant qualifies as an initial aggressor—often never gets to
decide this key question that can make or break a defendant’s case. Third, this
Article proposes a way to resolve this problem. It is the first to suggest that judges
should be required to give an initial aggressor instruction whenever a defendant
claiming self-defense brought a firearm outside the home and displayed it in a
threatening manner or pointed it at another person. By lowering the threshold to get
an initial aggressor instruction to the jury, the proposal ensures that the jury, rather
than the judge, gets to decide whether the defendant was the initial aggressor.
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Introduction
On June 28, 2020, a White1 couple garnered national attention
after brandishing firearms at Black Lives Matter protesters marching past
their home in St. Louis, Missouri.2 Cell phone video footage shows
Patricia McCloskey pointing a semi-automatic handgun at the unarmed
protesters while her husband Mark McCloskey is seen behind her holding
an AR-15 rifle.3 Even though none of the protestors appeared to threaten
1The

author purposely capitalizes the words “Black” and “White” except where the words are
lower case in quotations. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in
Black, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/timeto-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/ (https://perma.cc/ER4S-JVUD) (last visited April 2,
2022) (explaining why it is important to capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when
referring to Black and White people); Lori L. Tharps, The Case for Black With a Capital B,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-forblack-with-a-capital-b.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1 (https://perma.cc/YGG2-3XWS) (last
visited April 2, 2022) (“When speaking of a culture, ethnicity or group of people, the name
should be capitalized.”); Brooke Seipel, Why the AP and Others Are Now Capitalizing the ‘B’
in Black, HILL (June 19, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/media/503642-whythe-ap-and-others-are-now-capitalizing-the-b-in-black (https://perma.cc/WE6C-KQPU) (last
visited April 2, 2022).
2 Laurel Wamsley, Gun-Waving St. Louis Couple Plead Not Guilty To 2 Felony Charges,
NPR (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racialjustice/2020/10/14/923674576/gun-waving-st-louis-couple-plead-not-guilty-to-2-felonycharges (https://perma.cc/EZ84-5W5G) (last visited April 2, 2022) (noting that the
McCloskeys, both personal injury lawyers in their 60s, were captured on video outside their
mansion brandishing firearms at Black Lives Matter protestors, with Mark carrying an AR15 rifle and Patricia with her finger on the trigger of a semi-automatic handgun).
3
Mary Papenfuss, Mark McCloskey, Ordered To Surrender Gun He Aimed At Protesters,
Poses With New AR-15, HUFFPOST (June 23, 2021), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/markpatricia-mccloskey-pointing-guns-black-protesters_n_60cfc28ce4b01af0c271a4fa
(https://perma.cc/QDC6-3SWH) (last visited April 2, 2022) (showing footage of Patricia
McCloskey pointing a handgun at protestors and Mark McCloskey holding his AR-15
rifle) ; Daniel Politi, Remember the Couple Who Waved Guns at Protesters? The Missouri
Governor Just Pardoned Them., SLATE (Aug. 4, 2021), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2021/08/mark-patricia-mccloskey-missouri-governor-pardon.html
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physical violence against the McCloskeys and no one tried to enter their
home, the couple claimed they were simply acting in self-defense and in
defense of their home.4 When the two personal injury lawyers were
charged with two felonies5–unlawful use of a weapon6 and tampering
with evidence,7 their supporters asserted the McCloskeys were being
persecuted for exercising their Second Amendment rights.8
(https://perma.cc/C6SY-SX8Y) (last visited April 2, 2022) (“Mark McCloskey carried an
AR-15-style rifle, and Patricia McCloskey had a semi-automatic pistol.”).
4 Azi Paybarah, St. Louis Couple Who Aimed Guns at Protesters Plead Guilty to
Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/markpatricia-mccloskey-st-louis-couple-protesters.html (https://perma.cc/76FW-TSA9) (“[t]he
couple maintained that they had acted in self-defense, in order to prevent the demonstrators
from entering their home and harming them”).
5 Jack Suntrup, Parson says he'd “certainly” pardon the McCloskeys, the St. Louis couple
indicted on evidence tampering and gun charges, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 8,
2020), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/parson-says-he-d-certainlypardon-the-mccloskeys-the-st-louis-couple-indicted-on-evidence/article_e89c04a4-39e95dce-90ee-d6b5cb113a5a.html (https://perma.cc/GGH8-6DSE) (noting that in October
2020, a grand jury indicted the McCloskeys on felony charges of unlawful use of a weapon
and evidence tampering).
6 MO. REV. STAT. § 571.030 (1) (2021) (“A person commits the offense of unlawful use of
weapons . . . if he or she knowingly . . . (4) exhibits, in the presence of one or more persons,
any weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 575.030 (8) (2021) (“A person who commits the crime of unlawful use of weapons
under: (1) Subdivision (2), (3), (4), or (11) of subsection 1 of this section shall be guilty of a
class E felony”).
7 MO. REV. STAT. § 575.100 (“A person commits the offense of tampering with physical
evidence if he or she . . . [a]lters, destroys, suppresses or conceals any record, document or
thing with purpose to impair its verity, legibility or availability in any official proceeding or
investigation . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 575.100 (2) (“The offense of tampering with physical
evidence is a class A misdemeanor, unless the person impairs or obstructs the prosecution or
defense of a felony, in which case tampering with physical evidence is a class E felony.”).
8 Paybarah, supra note 2 (noting Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri, a Republican, remarked
that “the case against the McCloskeys ‘is a politically motivated attempt to punish this
family for exercising their Second Amendment rights.’ ”). See also Trump Defends St. Louis
Couple Who Pointed Firearms at Protesters, WASH. POST (July 15, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfdQAl_TEgc&ab_channel=WashingtonPost
(https://perma.cc/N55G-WMGV). It appears, however, that Kim Gardner, the prosecutor
who decided to file charges against the McCloskeys was the one who was persecuted.
Gardner was attacked by former President Trump who said thought the charges against the
McCloskeys were “absolutely absurd” and “an extreme abuse of power by the prosecutor.”
Tom Jackman, 67 Current, Former Prosecutors Defend St. Louis Prosecutor from Attacks
in McCloskey Gun Case, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/22/67-current-former-prosecutors-defendst-louis-prosecutor-attacks-mccloskey-gun-case/ (https://perma.cc/758Z-6W2J). In an
unusual move, the Attorney General of Missouri sought to have the charges dismissed. Id.
(noting that “Attorney General Eric Schmitt (R) filed an amicus brief asking for the charges
to be dismissed” even though “[t]he attorney general in Missouri has no jurisdiction in
criminal cases”). The unprecedented attacks on the prosecutor appear to have worked. In
April 2021, the Missouri Supreme Court removed Kim Gardner from the case on the ground
that she brought the charges against the McCloskeys for political gain, relying on the fact
that Gardner had mentioned the charges she brought against the McCloskeys in fundraising
emails. Christine Byers, Tampering charge against Patricia McCloskey dropped, could face
harassment misdemeanor, KSDK (May 25,
2021), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/crime/special-prosecutor-drops-tamperingpatricia-mccloskey-harassment-charge/63-2b617908-a10f-4f0f-a4e3-25cf55557a79
(https://perma.cc/9ZYR-WQ77). After former U.S. Attorney Richard Callahan took over the
case, the McCloskeys pled guilty to misdemeanor charges. Kevin S. Held, Parson pardons
McCloskeys for gun-waving plea deal, FOX2NOW (Aug. 3,
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Fortunately, the couple did not fire their weapons, and no one
was killed or injured as a result of their actions. The McCloskeys did
not take their claim of self-defense to a jury but pled guilty to lesser
charges.9
Imagine, however, if they had fired their weapons, killed a
protester, and then were charged with a criminal homicide. Would a
claim that they acted in self-defense succeed in such a case?
The answer to the question of whether our hypothetical
McCloskeys would have a viable claim of self-defense depends in part
on whom you ask. Self-defense doctrine turns in large part on whether
a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have believed they
were being imminently threatened with death or serious bodily injury.10
The video footage does not appear to show any threat of death or
serious bodily injury, let alone an imminent threat. No protestor is
advancing towards the McCloskeys or making threatening gestures.11
Even more importantly, not one of the protestors marching in front of
the McCloskeys’ home appears to have been armed, so it is hard to
argue that a reasonable person would have believed they were facing an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.12 Nonetheless, many
prominent politicians rushed to defend the McCloskeys, stating that the
2021), https://fox2now.com/news/missouri/parson-pardons-mccloskeys-on-gun-wavingconvictions/ (https://perma.cc/B5GA-GBH4). Mark McCloskey pled guilty to fourth degree
assault; Patricia pled guilty to harassment. Id. The couple were ordered to pay fines ($750
for him, $2,000 for her) and destroy the weapons they pointed at protestors. Id. On July 30,
2021, Missouri Gov. Mike Parsons pardoned the couple. Id. Jennifer Weiser & Mark
Slavit, McCloskey attends Missouri State Fair, thanks Parson for pardon, KRCG (Aug. 19,
2021), https://krcgtv.com/news/local/mccloskey-attends-missouri-state-fair-thanks-parsonfor-pardon (https://perma.cc/996N-5RA2).
9 Meryl Kornfield, St. Louis Couple Who Pointed Guns at Protesters Plead Guilty, Will
Give Up Firearms, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/06/17/st-louis-couple-guns/
(https://perma.cc/7JKQ-NKQA) (noting that in exchange for dismissal of felony firearms
charges, “Patricia McCloskey, 61, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor harassment and was fined
$2,000. Mark McCloskey, 63, pleaded guilty to misdemeanor fourth-degree assault and was
fined $750”).
10 For critique of the reasonableness requirement in self-defense cases, see Kevin Jon Heller,
Beyond the Reasonable Man - A Sympathetic But Critical Assessment of the Use of
Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1 (1998) (examining reasonableness standards in self-defense and provocation
cases); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete: A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 435 (1981)
(arguing that the reasonable man standard utilized in self-defense cases does not accurately
reflect the experiences of women and minorities); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (NYU Press 2003)
(examining ways in which racial stereotypes can influence the reasonableness determination
in self-defense and provocation cases).
11 Jessica Lussenhop, Mark and Patricia McCloskey: What really went on in St Louis that
day?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-53891184
(https://perma.cc/D37W-4U79); KMOV ST. LOUIS, Charges filed against Mark and Patricia
McCloskey, YOUTUBE (July 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUMfKFLGDcE&t=43s (https://perma.cc/GJD7R52A).
12 US Couple Who Pointed Guns At BLM Protesters 'To Speak At Republican Convention',
BBC NEWS (August 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53819020
(https://perma.cc/43Z4-28FV).
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couple were in fear for their lives and suggesting that it was reasonable
for them to be afraid of violence from the protesters.13
Whether our hypothetical McCloskeys would have been
justified in using deadly force14 against a protester also turns in part on
whether Missouri’s self-defense doctrine recognizes an initial aggressor
limitation on the defense of self-defense and what that initial aggressor
limitation looks like.15
As a general matter, initial aggressors have no right to claim
self-defense.16 Initial aggressors also have a duty to retreat before using
deadly force even in jurisdictions that ordinarily do not impose a duty
to retreat.17 Unlike the broader question of whether an individual acted
justifiably in self-defense, which can turn in large part on the cultural
13

Tom Jackman, 67 current, former prosecutors defend St. Louis prosecutor from attacks
in McCloskey gun case, WASH. POST (July 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/22/67-current-former-prosecutors-defendst-louis-prosecutor-attacks-mccloskey-gun-case/ (perma.cc/758Z-6W2J) (noting that
Governor Mike Parson “called for [Kim] Gardner to resign, and then said if the McCloskeys
were convicted, he would pardon them[,] U.S. Sen. Josh Hawley sent a letter to Attorney
General William P. Barr demanding a civil rights investigation[, and the President]Trump
said any attempt by Gardner to prosecute would be “a disgrace”); Brakkton Booker, St.
Louis Couple Who Waved Guns At Black Lives Matter Protesters To Speak At RNC, NPR
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racialjustice/2020/08/18/903478960/st-louis-couple-who-brandished-guns-at-black-protesters-tospeak-at-rnc (https://perma.cc/ZAQ7-HDR5) (quoting Senator Josh Hawley, who called the
McCloskeys’ felony charges “an outrageous abuse of power”); FOX NEWS, St. Louis
homeowner Mark McCloskey joins Tucker after being charged with felony for defending his
home (July 20, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/transcript/st-louis-homeowner-markmccloskey-joins-tucker-after-being-charged-with-felony-for-defending-his-home
(https://perma.cc/822U-LQSS) (transcript from “Tucker Carlson Tonight” with multiple
quotes from anchor Tucker Carlson defending the McCloskeys who were “exercising the
most basic right of all: the ancient and immutable right to self-defense” and “did nothing
wrong.”). The McCloskeys were even invited to give an address at the 2020 Republican
National Convention. Brakkton Booker, St. Louis Couple Who Waved Guns At Black Lives
Matter Protesters To Speak At RNC, NPR (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racialjustice/2020/08/18/903478960/st-louis-couple-who-brandished-guns-at-black-protesters-tospeak-at-rnc (https://perma.cc/ZAQ7-HDR5). Mark McCloskey has since declared himself a
Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate. Kevin S. Held, Parson pardons McCloskeys for
gun-waving plea deal, FOX2NOW (Aug. 3,
2021), https://fox2now.com/news/missouri/parson-pardons-mccloskeys-on-gun-wavingconvictions/.
14 States are split over whether the display of a firearm constitutes deadly force. Kimberly
Kessler Ferzan, Taking Aim at Pointing Guns? Start with Citizen’s Arrest,
Not Stand Your Ground, A Reply to Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles,
and Darrell A.H. Miller, Pointing Guns, 99 TEXAS L. REV. 1173 (2021), 100 TEX. L. REV.
ONLINE (Sept. 29, 2021) (noting that Florida, Michigan, and Texas treat the display of a
weapon as nondeadly force whereas Missouri, where the McCloskeys displayed their
firearms, treats the display of a weapon as deadly force). Apparently, Florida courts have
found that the pointing of a gun at another person’s head is nondeadly force. Id., citing
Copeland v. State, 277 So.3d 1137, 1140, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019), quoting Jackson
v. State, 179 So.3d 443, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
15 Missouri recognizes the initial aggressor limitation on the defense of self-defense. . Under
Missouri law, “A person may…use physical force upon another person…unless the actor
was the initial aggressor.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031(1)(1) (West 2021).
16 Thomas A. Mauet, Defense of Person in Homicide Cases: The Law and the Investigative
Approach, 4 POLICE L.Q. 5, 8 (1975).
17 Id.
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values of the person making that determination,18 the initial aggressor
limitation is a legal mechanism that has the potential to act as a
deterrence mechanism and bring about more consistency in selfdefense cases, but only if reformed.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some
type of an initial aggressor rule,19 but the patchwork of initial aggressor
rules that exist across the nation are not at all uniform. States differ on
what it takes to be considered an initial aggressor. Some initial aggressor
rules do not actually preclude the aggressor from claiming self-defense
but simply impose a duty to retreat on initial aggressors20 where a nonaggressor would have no corresponding duty.21 Other initial aggressor
18

Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. l (2008).
19 See infra note 62. I use the term “initial aggressor rule” to broadly include rules that limit
the defense of self-defense when the defendant does something that sets the conflict in
motion, including provisions that use the language of provocation and those that use
aggressor language.
20 Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, and Wyoming are Stand Your Ground states that have not
adopted a traditional initial aggressor rule but do require initial aggressors to retreat when all
other individuals claiming self-defense have no duty to retreat. See, e.g., People v. Riddle,
649 N.W. 2d. 30, 39 (Mich. 2002) (“[W]here a defendant ‘invites trouble’ or meets nonimminent force with deadly force, his failure to pursue an available, safe avenue of escape
might properly be brought to the attention of the factfinder as a factor in determining
whether the defendant acted in reasonable self-defense.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(4)
(2021) (stating that “(4) A person who is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in
unlawful activity shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force . . . if the person is
in a place where the person has a right to be, and no finder of fact shall be permitted to
consider the person’s failure to retreat as evidence that the person’s use of force was
unnecessary, excessive or unreasonable.”). NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120(2)(a) (2020) (stating
that “2. [a] person is not required to retreat before using deadly force . . . if the person: (a)
[i]s not the original aggressor.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-602(e) (2021) (“A person who is
attacked in any place where the person is lawfully present shall not have a duty to retreat
before using reasonable defensive force pursuant to subsection (a) of this section provided
that he is not the initial aggressor and is not engaged in illegal activity”). Missouri, like
other Stand Your Ground states, does not ordinarily require individuals to retreat before
using deadly force if they are in a place where they have a right to be. MO. ANN. STAT. §
563.031(3) (West 2021). It does, however, require initial aggressors to retreat or withdraw.
Under Section 563.031 of the Missouri Code, “A person may…use physical force upon
another person…unless the actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case his or her
use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided…[h]e or she has withdrawn from the
encounter.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031(1)(1) (West 2021).
21 Stand Your Ground laws generally allow an individual to stand his ground if attacked in
any place where that individual has a lawful right to be if the individual reasonably believes
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§776.012 & 776.013 (3); Giffords Law Center, Stand Your Ground,
https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws/
(https://perma.cc/TJC8-657D) (listing states with “Shoot First” or “Stand Your Ground”
laws). For commentary on Stand Your Ground laws, see Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your
Ground” and Self-Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 90 (2015); Renee Lettow Lerner, The
Worldwide Popular Revolt Against Proportionality in Self-Defense Laws, 2 J. L. ECON. &
POL’Y 331, 342 (2006); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Stand Your Ground, in THE PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 731, 731 (Alexander & Kessler eds.
2019). For racial critiques of Stand Your Ground laws, see Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill:
A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 827, 832-33 (2013);
Mario L. Barnes, Taking a Stand?: An Initial Assessment of the Social and Racial Effects of
Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3179, 3192-96 (2015).
Compare Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand
Your Ground, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961, 962 (2014) (arguing that progressives who have
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rules preclude provocateurs and aggressors from claiming self-defense
but make it challenging for the government to demonstrate initial
aggressor status. For example, some require proof that the defendant
intended to provoke the victim into attacking the defendant so the
defendant could counterattack and claim self-defense.22 Others require
proof that the defendant was engaging in unlawful conduct before the
defendant forfeits the right to claim self-defense.23
More importantly, there are no clear rules regarding whether
and when an initial aggressor instruction must be given to the jury. An
initial aggressor instruction is not an automatic, standard instruction
given whenever the jury is charged on self-defense. Even when the
defendant was the person who started the conflict, a judge may choose
not to give an initial aggressor instruction.
Unfortunately, the McCloskey incident is not the only time in
recent history that a firearm owner has felt so threatened by an
unarmed person that they felt the need to point a loaded gun at that
person. In July of 2020, for example, a White woman cocked a loaded
gun and pointed it for several minutes at a Black woman in a Chipotle
parking lot.24 The incident apparently started when Jillian Wuerstenberg
bumped Takelia Hill’s 15-old-teenage daughter, Makayla, when
Wuerstenberg was leaving and Makayla was entering the restaurant.25 A
verbal altercation ensued between Hill and Wuerstenberg as well as
between Hill and Wuerstenberg’s husband.26
When the Wuerstenbergs got into their minivan and started
backing out of their parking spot, Hill, who was standing behind the
vehicle, thought they were trying to use the vehicle to hit her and her
daughter, so she hit the back of the vehicle with her hands to warn
them to stop.27 This prompted Wuerstenberg to load her gun and get
called for the repeal of stand-your-ground laws have done so out of a misplaced punitive
impulse and they should instead focus on trying to enact reform aimed at achieving racial
equality).
22 See infra Part I.A.
23 See infra text accompanying note 109.
24 According to one news source, 15-year-old “Makayla [Green] was walking through a strip
mall on her way to the [Chipotle] restaurant as the woman was walking in the other
direction . . . When the woman allegedly bumped into Makayla, the teenager called her out.
‘I had moved out of the way so she [could] walk out,’ Makayla told the News. ‘She bumped
me and I said, ‘Excuse you.’ And then she started cussing me out, and saying things like I
was invading her personal space.’” Teo Armus & Ben Guarino, She’s Got the Gun on Me:
White Woman Charged With Assault After Pulling Pistol On Black Mother, Daughter,
WASH. POST (July 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/02/michiganwoman-gun-video/ (https://perma.cc/P58E-USS8). See also First on 7: Couple Seen In Viral
Video Pointing Gun at Family 'Feared For Their Lives;' Family Attorney Says There Was
No Threat, ABC7 WXYZ DETROIT (July 9, 2020), https://www.wxyz.com/news/america-incrisis/only-on-7-couple-seen-in-viral-video-pointing-gun-at-family-feared-for-their-livesfamily-attorney-says-there-was-no-threat (https://perma.cc/6SRV-ZPYA).
25 She’s Got the Gun on Me, supra note 24.
26 Freda Kahen-Kashi & Kelly McCarthy, White Woman Who Pointed Gun at A Black Mom
and Her Teen Daughter Charged With Assault, ABC NEWS (July 2, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/white-woman-pointed-gun-black-mom-teendaughter/story?id=71584436 (https://perma.cc/KK3K-JCYU).
27 Id.
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out of her vehicle, pointing her gun at Hill.28 The incident was captured
on cell phone video, showing Wuerstenberg with her finger on the
trigger, cursing and yelling “Back the F___ up” several times at Hill.29
In the end, Wuerstenberg returned to her vehicle without firing her
weapon.30 She and her husband were arrested and charged with one
count of felonious assault.31 Wuerstenberg claimed she pulled a gun on
Hill because she feared for her life.32
The incident in the Chipotle parking lot is concerning because it
serves as a reminder of our society’s deeply engrained fear of the Black
body, a fear rooted in stereotypes about Black people as dangerous,
violent, criminals.33 Since the death of George Floyd in May 2020, the
movement for Black Lives has helped focus the nation’s attention on
the fact that Black men and women are disproportionately killed by
police officers in the United States.34 While not applicable in George
Floyd’s case since he was not shot to death, this disproportion is in part
the result of threat perception failure, which occurs when an officer
thinks an individual has a gun but the person is actually unarmed.35
28

Id.
Mark Hicks, Couple Charged in Chipotle Incident Bound Over For Trial, DETROIT NEWS
(July 21, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/oaklandcounty/2020/07/21/couple-charged-chipotle-incident-trial-orion-township/5482934002/
(https://perma.cc/SC5U-9XYV) (showing video of incident).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (noting that the stereotype that links Blacks
with violence, dangerousness, and criminality has been documented by social psychologists
for over half a century); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND
FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 138-46 (NYU Press 2003) (discussing the tendency to
associate Blacks with crime); Jonathan Markovitz, “A Spectacle of Slavery Unwilling to
Die”: Curbing Reliance on Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense Cases, 5 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 873 (2015); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (discussing the Black-asCriminal stereotype and its influence on cases involving claims of self-defense by
individuals charged with crimes of violence against Black individuals). See also Birt L.
Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the
Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595 (1976)
(finding that 75% of individuals observing a Black person shoving a White person thought
the shove constituted "violent" behavior while only 17% of individuals observing a White
person shoving a Black person characterized the shove as "violent" and 42% characterized
the shove as "playing around"). See also H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial
and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive
Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1980) (finding that both Black and
White children saw relatively innocuous behavior by Blacks as more threatening than
similar behavior by Whites).
34 Deidre McPhillips, Deaths from Police Harm Disproportionately Affect People of Color,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 3, 2020, 4:07 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2020-06-03/data-show-deaths-from-police-violencedisproportionately-affect-people-of-color (noting that about a third of the more than 1,000
unarmed people who died as a result of police harm between 2013 and 2019. were Black).
35 Lois James, Stephen M. James & Bryan J. Vila, The Reverse Racism Effect: Are Cops
More Hesitant to Shoot Black Than White Suspects?, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 457, 458
(2016) (defining threat perception failure as akin to a mistake of fact situation when, for
example, the officer mistakes a cellphone for a gun or thinks the suspect is reaching for a
weapon when the suspect was reaching for his wallet).
29
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Threat perception failure is more likely to occur when officers are
confronting a Black individual than when they are confronting a White
individual because of the Black-as-Criminal stereotype.36
Threat perception failure and the tendency to automatically
associate Black individuals with danger and criminality is not just a
problem for police officers, it is also a problem that afflicts laypersons.
Numerous empirical studies have found that laypersons are quicker to
perceive a weapon in the hands of a Black person, even if the Black
person is in fact unarmed or holding a harmless object, than they are to
perceive an actual weapon in the hands of a White person.37
Now we don’t have any reason to think that Jilian
Wuerstenberg pulled her gun on Takelia Hill because she thought the
Black mother was armed, but we do know that Wuerstenberg said the
reason she got out of her car and aimed her loaded gun at Hill was
because she feared for her life.38 The tendency to associate Black
individuals with violence might have led to that fear. As Addie Rolnick
observes, “[r]esearch on unconscious bias and cultural myths about
criminality demonstrate that fear is racially contingent.”39
Fear is often a driving force behind firearms incidents in which
a person displays or points a gun at another person. These incidents are
a serious concern and occur far more frequently than most of us
recognize but often fly under the radar.40 Moreover, as Joseph Blocher
36

Why Do U.S. Police Keep Killing Unarmed Black Men?, BBC (May 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32740523.
37 See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial
Arts Training, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2016) (providing a detailed analysis of
shooter bias studies); Melody S. Sadler et al., The World Is Not Black and White: Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot in a Multiethnic Context, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 286, 295 (2012)
(noting that “participants were especially likely to favor the ‘shoot’ response over the ‘don't
shoot’ response when the target was Black rather than any other race”); Joshua Correll et al.,
Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1015, 1020 (2007); Joshua Correll et al., The Police
Officers Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315 (2002) (finding that when participants were
little time to decide whether to shoot, they mistakenly shot unarmed targets more often if
they were Black than if they were White); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The
Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (2001) (finding “participants identified guns faster when they were
primed by a Black face then by a White face” and “identified tools were quickly when
primed with a White face, compared to a Black face”); Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Targets of Discrimination: Effect of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 379, 401 (2000) (finding subjects had greater difficulty
distinguishing weapons from harmless objects when the person holding one of these objects
was Black and were quicker to see a weapon when they saw a Black individual holding a
weapon than when they saw a White individual holding a weapon).
38 When asked by one reporter why she loaded her gun, Wuerstenberg said, “That meant I
am about to die and I don’t want to die.” First on 7: Couple Seen In Viral Video Pointing
Gun at Family ‘Feared For Their Lives;’ Family Attorney Says There Was No Threat,
ABC7 WXYZ DETROIT (July 9, 2020), https://www.wxyz.com/news/america-in-crisis/onlyon-7-couple-seen-in-viral-video-pointing-gun-at-family-feared-for-their-lives-familyattorney-says-there-was-no-threat (https://perma.cc/6SRV-ZPYA).
39 Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1639 (2019).
40 Joseph Blocher, et al., Pointing Guns, 99 TEX. L. REV. 101, 104 (2021). Cf. Samantha
Raphelson, How Often Do People Use Guns In Self-Defense?, NPR (Apr. 13, 2018),
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has noted, current law inadequately answers the question of whether a
person who displays a firearm in public has committed a crime or acted
in self-defense.41 This Article begins to address this question, using the
initial aggressor limitation on the right of self-defense to provide
guidance on how the display of a gun should impact one’s ability to
claim self-defense.
Until recently, judges, legal scholars, and others have paid
relatively little attention to the initial aggressor limitation on the defense
of self-defense.42 Two high profile criminal trials in 2021—one
involving Kyle Rittenhouse, the 17-year-old teenager who brought an
AR-15 style rifle to Kenosha, Wisconsin during the third night of racial
protests in 2020 over the police shooting of Jacob Blake, and ended up
shooting three men, killing two and injuring the third,43 and the other
involving the shooting of an unarmed Black man named Ahmaud
Arbery as he was jogging in a predominantly White neighborhood in
Satilla Shores, Georgia44—put the initial aggressor limitation front and
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/13/602143823/how-often-do-people-use-guns-in-self-defense
(https://perma.cc/UW24-BHW3) (discussing critiques of 1995 Kleck and Gertz study that
found between 2.2 and 2.5 million defensive gun uses annually).
41 Id. at 110.
42 See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Provocateurs, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 597 (2013); Kimberle
Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral Liability to Defensive Killing, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 669 (2012); Margaret Raymond, Looking for Trouble: Framing and the
Dignitary Interest in the Law of Self-Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 294-99, 320 (2010)
(arguing against a broad time frame that looks back to see if defendant’s actions make him
an initial aggressor). Compare Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own
Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine 71 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1985)
(arguing for a broad time frame that looks at the actor’s conduct and culpability at the time
the actor creates the conditions leading to his defense). In addition, two student notes have
highlighted this area of the law. See Joshua D. Brooks, Note, Deadly-Force Self-Defense
and the Problem of the Subtle Provocateur, 24 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 533 (2015); Alon
Lagstein, Note, Beyond the George Zimmerman Trial: The Duty to Retreat and Those Who
Contribute to Their Own Need to Use Deadly Self-Defense, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC
JUST. 367 (2014).
43 Reis Therault & Ted Armus, Competing Narratives Fuel Opposing Views of Kenosha
Protest Shooting, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2020, at A7(noting that at the end of the third night
of protests over the police shooting of Jacob Blake in Kenosha, Wisconsin, “a 17-year-old
wielding an AR-15-style rifle had shot and killed two men and injured a third” and that
Rittenhouse “traveled 20 miles from his home in Antioch, Ill., to Kenosha . . .”); Haley
Willis, Muyi Xiao, Christiaan Triebert, Christoph Koettl, Stella Cooper, David Botti, John
Ismay, & Ainara Tiefenthäle, Tracking the Suspect in the Fatal Kenosha Shootings, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020) (updated Nov. 16, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/us/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shooting-video.html
(https://perma.cc/KM2R-WDV5) (providing photos and video footage from the night when
Rittenhouse shot the three men).
44
Richard Fausset, What We Know About the Shooting Death of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/ahmaud-arbery-shootinggeorgia.html (https://perma.cc/73P7-MVQ9) (noting that Gregory McMichael and his son,
Travis McMichael “grabbed a .357 Magnum handgun and a shotgun, got into a pickup truck
and chased Mr. Arbery. . . Travis fired a shot and then a second later there was a second
shot”); Tim Craig, Emmanuel Felton, Hannah Knowles & Timothy Bella, Jury Finds All 3
Men Guilty of Murder in Ahmaud Arbery’s Death, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/11/24/ahmaud-arbery-trial-verdict/
(https://perma.cc/9PTB-SP2L) (reporting that “The violence at the center of the trial
unfolded on Feb. 23, 2020, when the McMichaels spotted Arbery running past their house
and took off after him in their truck”).

11

FIREARMS AND INITIAL AGGRESSORS

12

center of the national conversation on issues concerning self-defense
and racial justice.
The question of how the display of a firearm in public should
factor into a claim of self-defense has become more important than
ever as the nation continues to relax its restrictions on the carrying of
firearms in public.45 On November 3, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court
heard oral argument in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v.
Bruen.46 At issue is whether the state of New York may require
individuals applying for a license to carry a firearm in public to show
“proper cause” or whether such a licensing regime violates the Second
Amendment rights of individuals seeking to “keep” and “bear” arms in
public.47 Court observers have opined that the Court is likely to use the
Bruen case to extend its Heller decision and declare that individuals have
a Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public.48 If this
happens, gun enthusiasts may claim that people who carry firearms in
public and display, point, or discharge those firearms are simply
exercising their Second Amendment right of self-defense.
The existence of a Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms in the home or in public for the purpose of self-defense, however,
says nothing about whether any particular use of a firearm constitutes a
justified use of force. As a general matter, to succeed on a claim of selfdefense, one needs to have honestly and reasonably believed it was
necessary—at the time one acted—to use deadly force to counter an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.49 That determination
can only be made by considering the facts and circumstances facing the
individual at the time the individual acted. Those facts and
circumstances will differ from case to case. Whether one has a
constitutional right to “keep” and “bear” a firearm in public is a

45

Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing
trend toward loosening restrictions on carrying guns in public).
46 See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Seems Poised To Expand Second Amendment
Rights And Strike Down NY Handgun Law, CNN (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/03/politics/supreme-court-second-amendment-new-yorkbruen/index.html (https://perma.cc/DSR4-T23H).
47 Tom Kutch, SCOTUS Takes on Gun Carrying in Public, THE TRACE (Apr. 27, 2021),
https://www.thetrace.org/newsletter/scotus-takes-on-gun-carrying-in-public/
(https://perma.cc/C5G9-6SFH); New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Corlett,
No. 20-843 CJS, 2021 WL 1602643 (Apr. 26, 2021).
48 Jennifer Mascia, The Supreme Court’s Next Big Gun Case, Explained, THE TRACE (May
18, 2021), https://www.thetrace.org/2021/05/supreme-court-gun-rights-concealed-carrynew-york-corlett/ (https://perma.cc/7RM5-EDSG); Ian Millhiser, The NRA had a very good
day in the Supreme Court, VOX (Nov 3, 2021, 2:00 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2021/11/3/22761240/supreme-court-second-amendment-rifle-bruenheller-amy-coney-barrett (https://perma.cc/HH8V-6XUU) (predicting after oral arguments
in Bruen that New York’s centuries old gun regulation law is likely to be struck down); Ian
Millhiser, The NRA had a very good day in the Supreme Court, VOX (Nov 3, 2021, 2:00
PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/11/3/22761240/supreme-court-second-amendment-riflebruen-heller-amy-coney-barrett (https://perma.cc/HH8V-6XUU) (predicting after oral
arguments in Bruen that New York’s centuries old gun regulation law is likely to be ruled
unconstitutional).
49 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.01 211-19 (8th ed. 2018).
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separate and distinct question from whether one’s use of that firearm
constituted an act of self-defense.50
As the laws regulating guns in public become less restrictive and
as more localities reduce funding for police departments in response to
the racial justice protests following the death of George Floyd at the
hands of former police officer Derek Chauvin in 2020, an increasing
number of individuals may start to bring their firearms out with them
when they leave their homes.51 Unfortunately, more people with guns in
public increases the risk that minor disputes will end in gun violence,
serious injury, or fatalities.52 If a gun owner, for example, mistakenly
believes that another person has a gun, he may take out his own gun
and discharge it to counter the perceived threat.53 Joseph Blocher notes
that in many cases where a gun owner mistakenly thinks another
person poses a threat and pulls out a gun, the gun owner may think he
has successfully defended himself against a perceived threat when he
may have just committed a crime.54 With the laws on carrying guns in
public on the front end becoming less restrictive, it becomes
increasingly important to strengthen the laws concerning gun use on
the back end.
In light of the increasing number of incidents in which
individuals are using or threatening gun violence in public spaces,55 it is
essential to focus attention on the initial aggressor limitation on the
Blocher, Pointing Guns, supra note 41, at 122 (noting “historical legal commentary and
custom indicate that the question of whether a particular actual use of a gun constitutes selfdefense is a question left to criminal and tort law, about which the Second Amendment is
silent”), quoting Calderone v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 17, 2019, aff’d No. 19-2858, 2020 WL 6500933 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2020); Robert J.
Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment Rights, 80 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 55, 81-82 (2017) (noting that the common law right of self-defense was
well-established long before the Second Amendment and exists independently of the Second
Amendment), citing Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside the Home:
Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realties, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1703,
1707 (2012); Paul H. Robinson, A Right to Bear Firearms But Not To Use Them? Defensive
Force Rules and the Increasing Effectiveness of Non-Lethal Weapons, 89 BOSTON UNIV. L.
REV. 251, 252 (2009) (“It is the criminal law’s defensive force rules in the fifty-two
American jurisdictions, however, not the Second Amendment . . . that govern the use of
defensive force”).
51 Bellin, supra note 45 (discussing trend towards loosening restrictions on the carrying of
guns in public).
52 Despite the popularity of the slogan “More Guns, Less Crime,” suggested by John Lott
and David Mustard in 1997, see John R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and
Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1997), recent studies have
undercut that slogan, finding that permissive right-to-carry laws are associated with higher
rates of violent crime. See, e.g., John J. Donahue et al., Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent
Crime: A Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control
Analysis, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198, 199-200 (2019) (finding that right-to-carry
laws are associated with overall higher rates of violent crime). See also Emma E.
Fridel, Comparing the Impact of Household Gun Ownership and Conceal Carry Legislation
on the Frequency of Mass Shootings and Firearms Homicide, 38 JUST. Q. 892, 904-05, 907
(2021) (finding more permissive concealed carry legislation was associated with a 10.8
percent increase in firearms homicide incidence rate).
53 Blocher, Pointing Guns, supra note 41, at 108.
54 Id.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 176-183.
50
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defense of self-defense, a woefully understudied area of the law.56 This
Article attempts to fill the lack of legal scholarship in this area by
shining a much-needed spotlight on the initial aggressor doctrine.57
The Article starts in Part I by examining the initial aggressor
limitation on the defense of self-defense. Rather than one uniform
definition of initial aggressor, states have embraced varying and
sometimes inconsistent definitions. What is necessary to trigger initial
aggressor status also varies from state to state. Part I demonstrates that
the existing law on initial aggressors is in disarray and badly in need of
reform.
Part II drills down and exposes additional problems with the
initial aggressor limitation on the defense of self-defense, using two
high profile cases as examples. Part II dissects the initial aggressor
instruction given to the jury in the Kyle Rittenhouse case and exposes
56

See supra note 42.
While many legal scholars have studied various aspects of the doctrine of self-defense,
see, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man - A Sympathetic But Critical
Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and
Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1998) (examining reasonableness standards in
self-defense and provocation cases); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the
Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14
LOY. L. A. L. REV. 435 (1981) (arguing that the reasonable man standard utilized in selfdefense cases does not accurately reflect the experiences of women and minorities); Dan M.
Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that people have polarizing reactions to self-defense cases because
of the psychological tendency to resolve factual ambiguities in a way that supports one’s
defining values and comports with one’s core beliefs); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and
Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2001); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction
in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFFALO
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 206 (1998) (arguing that self-defense doctrine should focus on
reasonableness of both the actions and beliefs of the defendant claiming self-defense rather
than just the reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs); Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense:
Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51 (2008) (arguing
that juries should consider whether a person accused claiming self-defense acted with
reasonable self-control, not whether the actor’s reasonable beliefs about threatened harm
justified his response); Jonathan Markovitz, “A Spectacle of Slavery Unwilling to Die”:
Curbing Reliance on Racial Stereotyping in Self-Defense Cases, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 873
(2015) (exploring ways to prevent racial bias from pervading self-defense trials); Addie C.
Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639 (2019) (exploring the
relationship between race, fear, and place in the context of self-defense); Cynthia Kwei
Yung Lee, Race and Self Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81
MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (exposing how racial stereotypes can influence the reasonableness
determination in self-defense cases); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self Defense
and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2012) (exploring ways in which implicit
bias skews reasonableness determinations in self-defense cases and contributes to errors of
judgment); Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
119 (2008) (arguing that the accused’s racism alone should not defeat their claim of selfdefense because criminal law should punish those who choose to cause unjustified harm, not
those who simply possess racist beliefs and cause otherwise justifiable harm); Jody D.
Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994) (examining ways in which racial
bias pervades self-defense claims); Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y
187 (2006) (arguing that the right of self-defense is constitutional); Camille A. Nelson,
Consistently Revealing the Inconsistencies: The Construction of
Fear in the Criminal Law, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1261 (2004) (explaining how racial bias
influences reasonableness determinations in criminal law), few have focused extensively on
the initial aggressor limitation on the defense of self-defense. See supra note 42.
57
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problems with that jury instruction. Part II also theorizes that
uncertainty as to whether the judge in the Rittenhouse case would even
give the jury an initial aggressor instruction undercut the government’s
ability to prepare a stronger case from the outset. Part II then uses the
George Zimmerman (Trayvon Martin) case to illustrate additional
problems with initial aggressor rules. Because there is so little clarity
regarding when an individual qualifies as an initial aggressor, reasonable
minds can disagree about whether an initial aggressor instruction
should be given. Indeed, in the Zimmerman case, legal scholars
disagreed about this very question. When the trial judge has complete
discretion over whether to give an initial aggressor instruction and the
rules concerning whether such an instruction should be given are
unclear, this can lead to inconsistency. Some defendants, like George
Zimmerman, will benefit from a judge’s decision not to give an initial
aggressor instruction and other defendants will not get this benefit.
Part III offers two tentative proposals for reform. First, the
Article attempts to clarify the meaning of the term “initial aggressor” by
proposing that a criminal defendant who claims self-defense should be
considered an initial aggressor if his or her words or acts created a
reasonable apprehension of imminent death or serious physical harm.
Unlike many self-defense statutes that utilize the language of
provocation and require an intent by the defendant to provoke the
victim into attacking so the defendant can counterattack and claim selfdefense, the proposed definition does not require proof that the
defendant had a pre-existing intent to harm the victim for initial
aggressor status. It shifts the focus away from the mental state of the
defendant and instead asks whether a reasonable person in the victim’s
shoes would have feared imminent death or physical injury from the
defendant.58 If so, this would be sufficient evidence of initial aggressor
status to trigger an initial aggressor instruction.
Second, the Article proposes that an initial aggressor jury
instruction be mandatory whenever a defendant brings a firearm
outside of the home and displays it in a threatening manner or points it
at another person, is charged with a crime, and claims self-defense.
Pointing a firearm at another person and displaying a firearm in a
threatening manner are threatening acts that as a general matter will
create a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily injury and
should therefore be viewed as prima facie evidence of aggression.
58

This Article does not suggest that States that currently have only a provocation with intent
type of aggressor provision should replace that provision with an aggressor provision. It
simply encourages such States to supplement their provocation with intent provision with an
initial aggressor provision, using the proposed definition of aggressor. One virtue of the
provocation with intent type provisions is that less conduct is required in order to make one
an initial aggressor. Offensive words or insults could constitute provocation sufficient to
remove one’s right to claim self-defense as long as the defendant acted with the requisite
intent to provoke in order to cause the victim to attack so he could counterattack and claim
self-defense. Most jurisdictions with just an initial aggressor provision require more in the
way of conduct before a defendant can qualify as an initial aggressor but do not require any
specific intent. See infra Part III.
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Displaying a gun in a threatening manner is already a crime in most
jurisdictions. The proposal does not mandate that the jury find initial
aggressor status for all defendants who display a firearm in a
threatening manner or point a firearm at another person and then are
charged with a crime. It does, however, ensure that the ultimate
question of whether the defendant was an initial aggressor and thus
should lose the right to claim self-defense is left with the jury. This
Article also proposes that the jury may conclude that the defendant was
not the initial aggressor if it finds that the defendant displayed or
pointed the firearm in response to a credible threat of physical harm
and the defendant’s intent in pointing the firearm was to avoid a
physical confrontation.
Self-defense doctrine in general and the initial aggressor
limitation in particular can play an important role in discouraging
individuals from using their firearms to kill or injure others.59 As Eric
Ruben reminds us, “[t]he law of self-defense reflects a commitment to
shepherding conflicts away from violence, especially lethal violence.”60
Legislators and judges should honor this commitment by adapting selfdefense law to respond to the changed circumstances created by relaxed
gun laws. With the expansion of Second Amendment rights currently
overlapping with our nation’s racial reckoning, the initial aggressor
limitation on the defense of self-defense can be a powerful tool to help
maintain public safety.
I.

THE INITIAL AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE

As a general matter, a civilian criminal defendant who is
determined to be an initial aggressor loses the right to claim selfdefense.61 All 50 states and the District of Columbia have placed some
59

In a related vein, scholars have proposed reforms to the doctrine of provocation, also
known as the heat of passion defense, to discourage individuals from bringing their firearms
out in public and then using those firearms to kill others. Eric A. Johnson, When
Provocation Is No Excuse: Making Gun Owners Bear the Risks of Carrying in Public, 69
BUFFALO L. REV. 943 (2021).
60 Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 104 (2020). Similarly, in writing about the Castle Doctrine and its applicability to
co-habitants of a dwelling, Catherine Carpenter notes that many jurisdictions have found
that “the defendant’s interest in personal dignity of space—the sanctuary—is outweighed by
the interests in the prevention of deadly affrays and in the preservation of life between those
that share the sanctuary.” Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle
Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQUETTE L. REV. 653, 676 (2003).
61
The initial aggressor limitation is a feature of self-defense doctrine that applies to ordinary
civilians. It is not currently a limitation on police officers claiming justifiable force, the law
enforcement version of self-defense. Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of
Deadly Force: De-escalation, Pre-seizure Conduct and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL.
L. REV. 629, 661 (“most statutes on police use of force do not contain an initial aggressor
limitation”). Some have argued that the initial aggressor limitation should be applied to law
enforcement officers. Ben Jones, for example, argues that killings brought on by police
officer conduct that created or increased the risk of an encounter turning deadly merit legal
sanctions just as killings by civilians who are considered initial aggressors merit legal
sanctions. Ben Jones, Police-Generated Killings: The Gap Between Ethics and Law, ___
POL. RES. Q. ___ (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/10659129211009596.
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limitation on an initial aggressor’s ability to justify the use of force in
self-defense, whether by statute, case law, or jury instruction.62 It would,
however, be a mistake to think that there is one uniform rule governing
initial aggressors. Jurisdictions differ in terms of the ways in which their
initial aggressor rules are expressed. 63 Some jurisdictions utilize the
language of provocation and others utilize the language of aggression.
States also differ in terms of how they define an initial aggressor.64
This Article uses the term “initial aggressor” as an umbrella
term to capture the myriad of ways in which an individual can lose the
right to claim self-defense through one’s provocative or aggressive
actions. The term “initial aggressor” is also used in opposition to the
term “provocateur” to describe a particular category of initial aggressor.
This Part starts by explaining the different ways one can be considered

See also Toussaint Cummings, Note, I Thought He Had a Gun: Amending New York's
Justification Statute to Prevent Police Officers from Mistakenly Shooting Unarmed Black
Men, 12 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 781, 821 (2014) (arguing that when an officer
kills an unarmed Black man not involved in any criminal activity at the time of his death,
the officer should have to show he was not the initial aggressor and that his conduct was
reasonable for his action to be deemed justified). Currently, however, the initial aggressor
limitation on the doctrine of self-defense does not apply to police officers and this Article
does not suggest that it should.
62 ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(c) (2021); Brown v. State, 698 P.2d 671, 674 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-404(B)(3)(a)–(b) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2606(b)(1) (2021); People v. Gleghorn, 238 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (3) (a)–(c) (2020); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c) (2019);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464(c)(1) (2021); D.C. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 9.504 (2020); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 776.041(2) (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b) (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §
703-304(5)(a) (2021); State v. Turner, 38 P.3d 1285, 1290–91 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 7-4(b) (2012); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(g) (2020); State v. Badgett,
167 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Iowa 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-5226(b) (2020); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 503.060(2) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:21 (2021); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §
108(1) (2021); State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Evans, 454 N.E.2d. 458, 463 (Mass. 1983); People v. Riddle, 649 N.W.
2d. 30, 38 (Mich. 2002); State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 410–11 (Minn. 2006); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(4) (2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1)(1)(a) (2016); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-3-105(2) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §
200.200 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. § 627:4 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(2)(a) (West
2021); State v. Abeyta, 901 P.2d 164, 170–71 (N.M. 1995); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 35.15(1)
(McKinney 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.4(2) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-0503(2)(a) (2021); State v. Turner, 869 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Wilkie v. State,
242 P. 1057, 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.215 (2020); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (2021); State v. Guillemet, 430 A.2d 1066, 1068 (R.I. 1981);
Jackson v. State, 586 S.E.2d 562, 563 (S.C. 2003); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d. 92, 97
(S.D. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(4)(e)(2) (2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
9.31(b)(4) (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(3)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2021); State v.
Trombley, 807 A.2d 400, 406–07 (Vt. 2002); Lynn v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 1, 9 (Va.
Ct. App. 1998); State v. McConaghy, 146 P. 396, 397 (Wash. 1915); 11 WASH. PATTERN
JURY INSTR. § 16.04; State v. Taylor, 50 S.E. 247, 251; WIS. STAT. § 939.48(2)(c) (2021));
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-602(e) (2021).
63 In this Article, I use the term “initial aggressor” to include limitations on both
provocateurs and initial aggressors. Despite obvious differences between the two categories,
I include them both under the umbrella of initial aggressor rules because they share a key
commonality: both provocateurs and initial aggressors lose the right to claim they acted
justifiably in self-defense because of something they did to instigate the encounter that
ended with physical violence being used against another person.
64 See infra ___.
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an initial aggressor. It then examines the various ways “initial
aggressor” status can be triggered.

A.

Categories of Initial Aggressors

Initial aggressors can be divided into three categories: (1)
provocateurs or individuals who provoke their victims into physical
violence and then counterattack, claiming they acted in self-defense, (2)
initial aggressors, or simply aggressors, often defined as individuals who
are the first to use or threaten physical force, and (3) individuals
involved in mutual combat. Many states recognize only one of these
categories,65 some states recognize two categories,66 and a few states
recognize all three categories.67 Some states conflate the categories,
65

For example, Delaware, Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin appear to recognize only the
provocateur with intent limitation on the defense of self-defense. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 464(c)(1) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(a) (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3105(2) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(2)(a) (West
2021); Wilkie v. State, 242 P. 1057, 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 505(b)(2) (2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (West 2021); State v.
Taylor, 50 S.E. 247, 251 (W. Va. 1905) (jury instruction “which told the jury the defendant
could not justify the killing if he had brought on or begun the difficulty, although with no
intent to kill or do bodily injury to the deceased, should have been refused” because “[a]
man does not lose his right of self-defense unless he has done some wrongful act.”); WIS.
STAT. § 939.48(2)(c) (2021). California, Washington, DC, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, and
the state of Washington appear to recognize only the initial aggressor with withdrawal
limitation on the defense of self-defense. See People v. Gleghorn, 238 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1987); D.C. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 9.504 (2020); State v. Turner, 38 P.3d 1285,
1290-91 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:21 (2021); MO. REV. STAT. §
563.031(1)(1)(a) (2016); State v. McConaghy, 146 P. 396, 397 (Wash. 1915). Arizona,
Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia appear to have
adopted a blend of provocation and initial aggressor rules, using provocation language
without requiring intent and including the withdrawal language typically seen in initial
aggressor provisions. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-404(B)(3)(a)–(b) (2021); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 776.041(2) (2020); Commonwealth v. Evans, 454 N.E.2d. 458, 463 (Mass. 1983); State v.
Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 410–11 (Minn. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.4(2) (2021);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(4)(e)(2) (2021); Lynn v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 1, 9
(Va. Ct. App. 1998).
66 Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New York,
Oregon, and Utah appear to recognize both the provocation with intent and initial aggressor
with withdrawal categories. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-606(b)(1) (2021); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c) (2019); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-4(b) (2012); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §21-5226(b) (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.060(2) (2019); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
17-A, § 108(1) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. § 627:4 (2021); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 35.15(1)
(McKinney 2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.215 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(3)(a)(i)
(LexisNexis 2021).
67
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, New Mexico, and North Dakota recognize all three
categories of initial aggressor status: (1) provocation with intent, (2) initial aggressor with
withdrawal provision, and (3) mutual combat. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(c) (2021)
(“a person is not justified in using physical force if: (1) With intent to cause physical injury
or death to another person, he or she provoked the use of unlawful physical force by such
other person, (2) He or she was the initial aggressor, except that his or her use of physical
force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he or she withdraws from
the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his or her intent to do so,
but the latter person nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force,
[or] (3) The physical force involved was the product of a combat by agreement not
specifically authorized by law”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (3) (a)–(c) (2020) (“a
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describing aggressors as individuals who provoke.68 Regardless of which
category or set of categories a state embraces, the bottom line is that a
criminal defendant who is considered an initial aggressor usually loses
the right to claim self-defense.69
1.

Provocateurs

person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or
death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person;
or He or she is the initial aggressor, except that his or her use of physical force upon another
person under the circumstances is justifiable if he or she withdraws from the encounter and
effectively communicates to the other person his or her intent to do so, but the latter
nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; [or] (c) The physical
force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b) (2020) (“[a] person is not justified in using force . . . if he: (1)
[i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to use such force as an
excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; . . . or (3) [w]as the aggressor or was
engaged in a combat by agreement unless he withdraws from the encounter and effectively
communicates to such other person his intent to do so and the other, notwithstanding,
continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.”); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(g)
(2020) (“a person is not justified in using [reasonable] force if: (2) the person provokes
unlawful action by another person with intent to cause bodily injury to the other person; or
(3) the person has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor unless
the person withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent to
do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action”);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(2)(a) (2021) (“A person is not justified in using force if: a.
He intentionally provokes unlawful action by another person to cause bodily injury or death
to such other person; or b. He has entered into a mutual combat with another person or is the
initial aggressor unless he is resisting force which is clearly excessive in the
circumstances”). While New Mexico case law suggests a recognition of both the initial
aggressor category, see State v. Abeyta, 901 P.2d 164, 170–71 (N.M. 1995) (“the claim of
self-defense may fail if the defendant was the aggressor or instigator of the conflict . . .”),
and the provocation category, see State v. Chavez, 661 P.2d 887, 889 (N.M. 1983) stating
that “[t]he rule is well established in this jurisdiction that a defendant who provokes an
encounter, as a result of which he finds it necessary to use deadly force to defend himself, is
guilty of an unlawful homicide and cannot avail himself of the claim that he was acting in
self-defense”), New Mexico’s uniform jury instruction reflects all three variations of the
initial aggressor limitation, providing that the defendant is the initial aggressor if the
defendant “started the fight,” “agreed to fight,” or “intentionally provoked a fight in order to
harm victim.” NM REV. COURT RULES UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 14-5191 (West)
(2020). New Mexico places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was the initial aggressor. Id.
68 Iowa, Maryland, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Alaska appear to conflate the provocation and initial aggressor categories. See, e.g., State v.
Badgett, 167 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Iowa 1969) (“[t]o justify homicide on the ground that it was
committed in self-defense, four elements must be present: (1) the slayer must not be the
aggressor in provoking or continuing the difficulty that resulted in the homicide; (2) he must
retreat as far as is reasonable and safe before taking his adversary’s life, except in his home
or place of business; (3) he must actually and honestly believe he is in imminent danger of
death or great bodily harm and that the action he takes is necessary for self-preservation—
this danger need not be real, but only thought to be real in the slayer’s mind, acting as a
reasonable prudent person under the circumstances; (4) he must have reasonable grounds for
such belief”); State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (noting
that for perfect self-defense, the person “claiming the right of self-defense must not have
been the aggressor or provoked the conflict”).
69 Some states allow an individual who is an initial nondeadly aggressor to regain the right
to self-defense if the other person responds to their nondeadly force with deadly force. See
infra text accompanying note 116. Many states permit an initial aggressor to regain the right
to act in self-defense if they successful withdraw from the conflict and communicate their
withdrawal to the other person. See infra note ____.
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One type of initial aggressor is an individual who provokes
another person into attacking him so he can attack that other person
and claim he acted in self-defense. These individuals are called
provocateurs.
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan is one of the few legal scholars who
has written about provocateurs.70 To illustrate why provocateurs lose
the right to claim self-defense, Ferzan provides an example of a person
who provokes others into violence and then uses their attack as an
excuse to kill them:
Imagine a funeral ceremony with hundreds of mourners for a
widely respected African-American civil rights leader. A white
supremacist appears at the church and begins shouting
nonthreatening, racial epithets. Enraged mourners rush the
person, who pulls out a concealed gun and kills several of
them.71
Ferzan notes that “[a]cross jurisdictions, the white
supremacist’s . . . claim[] of self-defense will likely fail.”72 This is
because as a general matter, “when one intentionally provokes
another, . . . the provocateur is barred from using deadly force to
defend himself from the attack that he provoked.”73
Not much is required to qualify as provocation sufficient to
remove the ability to claim self-defense.74 In contrast to the treatment
of aggressors for whom mere words are usually insufficient for initial
aggressor status,75 insulting or offensive words can serve as the basis for
a claim that the defendant provoked another into violence and thus is
barred from claiming self-defense.76 For example, in Scott v.
Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court barred the defendant from
claiming self-defense because the defendant’s insulting words—calling
the victim’s father a bootlegger and a gambler—with the intent of
goading the victim into attacking him so he could kill the victim led to
70

Ferzan, Provocateurs, supra note 42.
This hypothetical comes from a concurring opinion in an actual case. Id. at 598, citing
State v. Riley, 976 P.2d 624, 631 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (Talmadge, J. concurring).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Brooks, supra note 42, at 541(explaining that “the term ‘provocateur’ is a term of art that
describes someone who uses language or conduct that is non-threatening and nonviolent . . .
to intentionally incite (or provoke) an attack so that the provocateur may then have a pretext
for killing the other in ostensibly lawful self-defense”).
75 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 431, 452 (Conn. 2015) (“[T]he mere use of offensive
words, without more, is insufficient to qualify a defendant as the initial aggressor”) ; People
v. Gordon, 223 A.D.2d 372, 373, (N.Y.S. 1st Dept. 1996) (“The court properly instructed
the jury that the concept of ‘initial aggressor’ did not encompass mere insults as opposed to
threats”); State v. Riley, 976 P.2d 624, 628-29 (Wash 1999) (noting that the mere use of
words alone to provoke do not establish the defendant as a provocateur or aggressor).
76 See, e.g., Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Words alone
may provoke the difficulty, thereby justifying a provocation charge”).
71
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the killing.77 In People v. Santiago, prosecution “witnesses testified
defendant shouted hostile gang slogans, made antagonistic gang signals
and then began shooting,” which the Illinois court found “constituted
evidence that defendant was the aggressor.”78 If hostile words and
verbal insults are sufficient to eliminate one’s ability to claim selfdefense, surely displaying a firearm in a threatening manner or pointing
a firearm at another person should be sufficient to remove one’s ability
to claim self-defense as well.
Perhaps because so little is required in terms of conduct to
qualify as a provocateur, states that preclude provocateurs from
claiming self-defense often impose a mens rea requirement before a
defendant seeking to assert the defense of self-defense can be
considered a provocateur.79 In these jurisdictions, the defendant must
129 S.E. 360, 361-62 (Va. 1925) (“one who applies to another the most vile and
opprobrious epithet known to mankind, and thus brings on the combat, should not be
permitted to justify the killing of another in resisting an assault so provoked on the ground
of necessity”).
78 People v. Santiago, 515 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987).
79 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (c) (1) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(a)
(2021) (deadly force is not justifiable if, “(a) [t]he actor, with the intent of causing death or
serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-105(2) (2021)( the justification of self-defense “is not available to
a person who: (2) purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force against the person,
unless: (a) the force is so great that the person reasonably believes that the person is in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that the person has exhausted every
reasonable means to escape the danger other than the use of force that is likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm to the assailant; or (b) in good faith, the person withdraws from
physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that the person
desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the
use of force”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4) (2020) (A person cannot justify the use of
deadly force with self-defense if “(a) [t]he actor, with the purpose of causing death or
serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter or (b)
[t]he actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety
by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right
thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no
duty to take, except that: (i) [t]he actor shall not be obliged to retreat from his dwelling or
place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by
another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34(2)(a) (West 2021); Wilkie v. State, 242 P. 1057, 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926) (“[a]n
individual is not permitted to provoke willingly or knowingly a difficulty, and then, when
the difficulty has resulted in his slaying an unarmed antagonist, justify such slaying on the
ground of self-defense”); 8 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2) (2021) (“[t]he use of deadly
force is not justifiable . . . if: (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily
injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or (ii) the actor
knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating,
except the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was
the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of
work the actor knows it to be”); State v. Taylor, 50 S.E. 247, 251 (W. Va. 1905) (holding
that jury instruction “which told the jury the defendant could not justify the killing if he had
brought on or begun the difficulty, although with no intent to kill or do bodily injury to the
deceased, should have been refused”); WIS. STAT. § 939.48(2)(c) (2021) (“[a] person who
provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack
as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to
claim the privilege of self-defense”). While Texas’ self-defense statute does not appear to
require an intent to provoke, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (West 2021) (“[t]he use of
force against another is not justified: (4) if the actor provoked the other’s use or attempted
use of unlawful force . . .”), case law in Texas appears to require such intent. See Mason v.
77
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have acted with the intent or purpose of getting the other person to be
the first to use physical force so the defendant could kill or injure the
other person and then claim self-defense. For example, Delaware’s selfdefense statute provides, “The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . .
if . . . [t]he defendant, with the purpose of causing death or serious physical
injury, provoked the use of force against the defendant in the same
encounter.”80 Similarly, New Jersey prohibits the justification of selfdefense “if . . . [t]he actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious
bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same
encounter.”81
In common law states, an individual acts intentionally if their
conscious object was to cause the social harm or engage in the
prohibited act.82 The Model Penal Code uses the term “purposely” in
lieu of intent but defines the term similarly. Under the Model Penal
Code, “[a] person acts purposely with respect to a material element of
an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result . . .”83
Because it is so challenging to prove an actor’s intent to do a
specific thing or achieve a specific result,84 it is rare for a defendant to
State, 228 S.W. 952, 954–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (“Before a party's right of self-defense
can be impaired or limited by the issue of provoking the difficulty, three things must concur:
(1) He must have intended to provoke his adversary to make the first overt act; (2) he must
do or say something, one or both, with the intention of bringing about that result; and (3) the
things that he does or says must be reasonably calculated to and do effect that object”).
80 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (c) (1) (2021) (emphasis added).
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(2)(a) (West 2021) (emphasis added). New Jersey also provides
that an individual “is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial
aggressor.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(2)(b) (West 2021).
82 State v. Hill, 408 S.W.3d 820, 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“A person acts purposely or with
purpose, with respect to his conduct or to a result thereof when it is his conscious object to
engage in that conduct or to cause that result.”); State v. Rothacher, 901 P.2d 82, 84 (Mont.
1995) (“A person acts purposely with respect to a result when it is his or her conscious
object to cause that result.”); Ta v. State, 459 S.W.3d 325, 328 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (“A
person acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause the result.”).
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
84 U.S. v. Camick, 796 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2015) ) (“Proving intent is often a
difficult task….”); Eberhart v. State, 526 S.E.2d 361, 363 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is often
difficult to prove with direct evidence an individual's intent as it existed at the time of the
act for which they are being prosecuted.”). See also Colin Maher, Crisis Not Averted: Lack
of Criminal Prosecutions Leave Limited Consequences For Those Responsible For the
Financial Crisis, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 459, 466 (2013) (“One of
the most difficult problems when attempting to obtain a conviction in a criminal prosecution
is proving a defendant's intent.”). In recognition of the fact that it is often impossible to
prove an actor’s intent, courts have adopted legal shortcuts in murder cases, allowing the
jury to infer an intent to kill in certain cases where the prosecution may have difficulty
proving the defendant intended to kill. For example, under what is known as the Deadly
Weapon Rule, the jury may infer an intent to kill if the defendant killed the victim with a
deadly weapon aimed at a vital part of the victim’s body. See Couser v. State, 157 A.2d 426,
427 (Md. 1960) (“The use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the body is a
circumstance which indicates a design to kill”); Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868, 875 (Nev.
2002) (“a specific intent to kill may be inferred from . . . the intentional use of a deadly
weapon upon the person of another at a vital part.”); Commonwealth v. Green, 144 A. 743,
747 (Penn. 1929) (“where one . . . unlawfully kills another by the use of a deadly weapon
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be deemed the initial aggressor in a state with a “provoke with intent”
type of initial aggressor rule. A defendant can always take the stand and
testify that it was not his intent to provoke the victim to physical
violence and if the victim is dead, there will be no one to counter the
defendant’s story. A judge who gives the jury an initial aggressor
provocateur instruction in a state that requires proof that the defendant
provoked the victim into physical violence with intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury to the victim also runs the risk of being reversed
on appeal. An appellate court can always reverse the trial court on the
ground that there was insufficient proof of the required intent to
provoke.85
Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of proving that an
individual claiming self-defense acted with the purpose of provoking
the other person into attacking him to give the individual a reason to
kill or injure the other person, some states impose provocateur status
on one who acts either purposely or knowingly. For example, in
Montana, the justification of self-defense “is not available to a person
who . . . purposely or knowingly provokes the use of force.”86 Similarly,
in Oklahoma, “[a]n individual is not permitted to provoke willingly or
knowingly a difficulty, and then, when the difficulty has resulted in his
slaying an unarmed antagonist, justify such slaying on the ground of
self-defense.”87
A minority of states use provocation language in their selfdefense statutes without requiring any type of mens rea.88 For example,
upon a vital part with a manifest intent so to use it, the presumption of fact arises, in the
absence of qualifying circumstances, that he intended the consequence of his act and to kill
his victim”). Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury may infer an
intent to kill in cases if death was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant’s
actions. Keller v. People, 387 P.2d 421, 424 (Colo. 1963) ("an accused is presumed to
intend the necessary or the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary
acts, knowingly performed."); Nichols v. State, 517 S.W.3d 404, 412 (Ark. 2017) ("a person
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his actions."); State v.
Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 539 (La. 1988) ("the preferable instruction is 'you may infer that
the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts. . . .'").
85 See, e.g., Elizondo v. State, 487 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (finding that trial
court erred in giving the jury a provocateur instruction because the evidence was insufficient
to support a finding that defendant acted with an intent to harm the victim and create a
pretext to shoot him in self-defense despite significant evidence that defendant was the one
who started the affray). The Texas Court of Appeals was probably correct as a matter of law
to conclude that there was insufficient evidence that Elizondo acted with an intent to create
a pretext so he could shoot the victim and then claim self-defense. Proving that the
defendant had this intent would be difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy in any case, which
is why the intent requirement renders the provocation limitation on the defense of selfdefense meaningless in most cases.
86 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-105(2) (West 2021).
87 Wilkie v. State, 242 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926) (noting that “’[t]o provoke
the difficulty’ has been defined as willingly and knowingly using some language or doing
some act after meeting the antagonist reasonably calculated to lead to the deadly conflict.”).
88 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-404 (B) (3) (a) & (b) (2021) (“The threat or use of
physical force against another is not justified . . . 3. If the person provoked the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the
encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he
cannot safely withdraw from the encounter, and (b) The other nevertheless continues or
attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.041(2)
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Michigan denies the defense of self-defense to anyone who
“provoke[ed] the difficulty in which he finds it necessary to use deadly
force.”89 Many of the states that use provocation language in their selfdefense statutes without an intent requirement allow the provocateur to
regain right to claim self-defense if they withdraw from the encounter
or communicated an intent to withdraw and the other person persists
in using physical force against them.90 Jurisdictions that use provocation
language without an intent requirement, particularly those that include
withdrawal language, are almost indistinguishable from jurisdictions
that use initial aggressor or aggressor language in their self-defense
provisions.
To make things even more confusing, some states use provoke
with intent language and include a withdrawal provision, allowing a
provocateur who provokes with the intention of causing death or
serious physical injury to regain the right to act in self-defense if he
withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice of his withdrawal
thus combining aspects from the usual provocation and aggressor
provisions. Wisconsin, for example, provides by statute that “[a] person
who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with
intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily
(2020) (providing that the justification of self-defense “is not available to a person who: (2)
[i]nitially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself, unless: (a)
[s]uch force or threat of force is so great that the person reasonably believes that he or she is
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or she has exhausted every
reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use or threatened use of force which
is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant; or (b) [i]n good faith, the
person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the
assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use or threatened use of force,
but the assailant continues or resumes the use or threatened use of force.”); Commonwealth
v. Evans, 454 N.E.2d. 458, 463 (Mass. 1983) (“the right of self-defense ordinarily cannot be
claimed by a person who provokes or initiates an assault unless that person withdraws in
good faith from the conflict and announces his intention to retire”) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Maguire, 378 N.E.2d 445, 448 (1978)); State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 410–11
(Minn. 2006) (“the absence of aggression or provocation by the actor is required before selfdefense may be claimed”) (citing State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. 1996));
State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405, 411 (Minn. 2006) (noting that “if an aggressor
withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal, expressly or impliedly, the
right to claim self-defense is restored”) (citing Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d. 269, 272
(Minn. 1986)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-51.4(2) (2021) (the justification of self-defense “is not
available to a person who used defensive force and who: (2) [i]nitially provokes the use of
force against himself or herself”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(b)(4)(e)(2) (2021) (the
threat or use of force against another is not justified “[i]f the person using force provoked
the other individual’s use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless: (A) [t]he person using
force abandons the encounter or clearly communicates to the other the intent to do so; and
(B) [t]he other person nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the
person”).
89 State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 278 (Minn. 2003).
90 For example, Arizona’s self-defense statute provides that “The threat or use of physical
force against another is not justified . . . [i]f the person provoked the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the
encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he
cannot safely withdraw from the encounter, and (b) The other nevertheless continues or
attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-404
(B) (3) (a) & (b) (2021).
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harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of selfdefense,”91 but goes on to provide that “(b) [t]he privilege lost by
provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from
the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant.”92
Withdrawal language is usually found in aggressor provisions,93 not
provocation provisions.
2.

Aggressors

A second category of individuals who can lose the right to claim
self-defense by their actions is the aggressor, also known as the initial
aggressor. An initial aggressor is generally understood as an individual
who initiates the physical confrontation by using or threatening physical
force.94 As a general matter, aggressors lose the right to claim selfdefense unless they withdraw from the conflict and communicate their
intent to withdraw to the other person who nonetheless attacks.95
Unlike statutory provisions or case law that utilize the language
of provocation and require an intent to cause the victim physical injury
or death before the defendant can be precluded from claiming selfdefense, states that utilize aggressor language tend not to specify a mens
rea that must be present for one to be deemed an initial aggressor.96
One can be deemed an aggressor through one’s conduct alone.
91

WIS. STAT. § 939.48(2)(c) (2021).
WIS. STAT. § 939.48(2)(b) (2021).
93 See infra note 95.
94 State v. Morse, 498 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“An initial aggressor is one
who first attacks or threatens to attack another”) (quoting State v. Hughes, 84 S.W.3d 176,
179 (Mo. App. 2002)).
95 See People v. Gleghorn, 238 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (“if one makes a
felonious assault upon another, or creates appearances justifying the other to launch a deadly
counterattack in self-defense, the original assailant cannot slay his adversary in self-defense
unless he has first, in good faith, declined further combat, and has fairly notified him that he
has abandoned the affray”); U. S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“one
who is the aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities of selfpreservation [unless] he communicates to his adversary his intent to withdraw and in good
faith attempts to do so”); State v. Turner, 38 P.3d 1285, 1290-91 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (“A
person is not entitled to claim self-defense or justify a homicide when he or she was the
aggressor or the one who provoked the altercation in which another person is killed, unless
such person in good faith first withdraws from further aggressive action”); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:21 (2021) (“[a] person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim
the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a
manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and
discontinue the conflict”) ; MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1)(1)(a) (2016) (“[a] person . . . may
use physical force . . . unless: (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such
case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided (a) [h]e or she has withdrawn
from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but
the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened use of unlawful
force.”); State v. McConaghy, 146 P. 396, 397 (Wash. 1915) (“An accused person who is an
aggressor in an affray, or by acts or words provokes or brings on an affray, cannot invoke
the doctrine of self-defense or be justified in shooting to prevent injury, unless before such
shooting, such aggressor in good faith sought and endeavored to withdraw from and
abandon the conflict").
96 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:21 (2021) (“[a] person who is the aggressor or who brings
on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict
92
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Additionally, unlike states that use the language of provocation
to limit the defense of self-defense, many states that use aggressor
language to limit self-defense provide that insulting or offensive words
are not sufficient to make one an initial aggressor. In New York, for
example, mere insults as opposed to threats are not sufficient to make
one an initial aggressor.97 Similarly, in Connecticut, mere use of
offensive words without more is insufficient to make one the initial
aggressor.98 Some states, however, allow mere words to qualify one as
the initial aggressor.99
In jurisdictions that utilize aggressor language, it is often
difficult to predict whether a defendant will be deemed an initial
aggressor because most self-defense statutes do not define the term
“aggressor,” leaving it to the courts to decide whether a particular
defendant was the aggressor and thus should lose he right to claim selfdefense. As discussed in more detail below, courts are not uniform in
the ways they define an initial aggressor.100 As a result, two similarly
situated defendants can be treated very differently. Even if both
defendants engaged in the exact same behavior, one might be precluded
from arguing self-defense while the other might be allowed to argue
self-defense.
3.

Individuals Engaged in Mutual Combat

Some states recognize a third way an individual can lose the
right to claim justifiable self-defense. In these states, individuals can
lose the right to act in self-defense if they were involved in mutual
combat.101 In states with a mutual combat provision, if A and B agree
to engage in combat, both A and B would be considered initial
aggressors, and both would lose the right to claim they were acting in
self-defense.
Some states require an antecedent agreement to fight before a
court can limit a defendant’s right to claim self-defense due to mutual
in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires
to withdraw and discontinue the conflict”); MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1)(1)(a) (2016) (“[a]
person . . . may use physical force . . . unless: (1) The actor was the initial aggressor; except
that in such case his or her use of force is nevertheless justifiable provided . . . (a) [h]e or
she has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to
such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened
use of unlawful force.”); State v. Woods, 374 N.W.2d. 92, 97 (S.D. 1985) (“[g]enerally, the
aggressor, or the one who produces the circumstances which make it necessary to take
another's life, is not entitled to assert self-defense.”).
97 People v. Gordon 223 A.D.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“The court properly
instructed the jury that the concept of ‘initial aggressor’ did not encompass mere insults as
opposed to threats”).
98 State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 431, 452 (Conn. 2015).
99 People v. Dunlap, 734 N.E.2d 973, 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“Even the mere utterance of
words may be enough to qualify one as an initial aggressor”).
100 See infra text accompanying notes 104-111.
101 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(c) (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (3)(c)
(2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b)(3) (2020); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) (2020); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03(2)(b) (2021).
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combat.102 Other states limit mutual combat to cases in which the
parties are armed with deadly weapons.103
B.

No Uniform Definition of “Initial Aggressor”

If one looks for a standard definition of “initial aggressor,” one
is unlikely to find uniformity. Wayne LaFave broadly defines an “initial
aggressor” as “one who brings about the difficulty with the other.”104
Joshua Dressler, in contrast, defines an “initial aggressor” more
narrowly as one whose "affirmative unlawful act [is] reasonably
calculated to produce an affray foreboding injurious or fatal
consequences."105
Some states define the initial aggressor as simply the first
person to use physical force or the first person to attack. California’s
standard jury instruction on self-defense, mutual combat or initial
aggressor, for example, suggests that an initial aggressor is a person
“who starts a fight.”106 Defining the initial aggressor as the first person
to use physical force, however, is underinclusive because it would not
capture an individual who, for no good reason, points a gun at an
unarmed person and threatens to shoot, causing the other person to
punch him. Under a definition that requires the initial aggressor to be
the first person to use physical force, the puncher would be the initial
aggressor because he was the first person to use physical force, even
though the individual who threatened to shoot should be considered
the initial aggressor since he was the one who started the confrontation.

Eckhardt v. People, 247 P.2d 673, 676 (Colo. 1952) ) (“An agreement to combat and
finish their troubles must exist and must be in the nature of an antecedent agreement to so
fight”); Carson v. State, 230 S.W. 997, 998 (Tex. 1921) (“The issue of mutual combat as a
limitation upon the right of self-defense does not arise alone from the fact that the parties to
the affray are mutually engaged in it. The issue arises out of an antecedent agreement to
fight. The agreement must exist”).
103 Flowers v. State, 247 S.E.2d 217, 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (“Mutual combat usually
arises when the parties are armed with deadly weapons and mutually agree or intend to fight
with them. Mutual combat does not mean a mere fist fight or scuffle.”), citing Grant v.
State, 170 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
104 WAYNE LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 10.4(e) (3d ed.),
citing State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 431, 452 (Conn. 2015).
105 DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 18.01[B][1] 214 (8th ed. 2018), citing United States v.
Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
106
CALCRIM No. 3471, which is entitled “Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial
Aggressor,” starts by providing, “A person who (engages in mutual combat/ [or who] starts
a ﬁght) has a right to self-defense only if . . .,” suggesting that an initial aggressor is a
person who starts a fight. See also In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1 (Cal. 1994)
(“It is well established that the ordinary self-defense doctrine—applicable when a defendant
reasonably believes that his safety is endangered—may not be invoked by a defendant who,
through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the
commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which his adversary's attack or
pursuit is legally justified”) (emphasis added), citing 1 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, CAL. CRIMINAL
LAW, Defenses, § 245 at 280 (2d ed. 1988); 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §
131(b)(2) at 74–75 (1984).
102
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In most states, being the first person to use physical force is not
a necessary condition for initial aggressor status.107 One who threatens
to use physical force without justification upon another can usually be
considered the initial aggressor even if the other person was the first
person to actually use physical force. For example, Connecticut
recognizes that the initial aggressor is not necessarily the first person to
use physical force but rather is “the person who first acts in such a
manner that creates a reasonable belief in another person’s mind that
physical force is about to be used.”108 Under this definition, if A raises
his hand and verbally threatens to slap B and B responds by punching
A, A can be considered the initial aggressor even though B was the first
person to use physical force.
Some jurisdictions impose an unlawful act requirement before
one can be deemed an aggressor. For example, the D.C. Circuit has
stated that an aggressor is one who engages in “an affirmative unlawful
act reasonably calculated to produce an affray foreboding injurious or
fatal consequences.”109 In requiring the defendant to have engaged in an
unlawful act, these jurisdictions substantially limit the number of actors
who can be considered initial aggressors. There are many things one
can do without necessarily breaking the law that might cause another
person to respond with violence.110 For example, an individual in a state
that freely allows the open carry of firearms could threaten another
person by showing that person that he is carrying a firearm. If such
conduct is not prohibited by statute, the person would not qualify as an
initial aggressor even if he was in fact the one who initiated the
conflict.111
DRESSLER, supra note 49, §18.01[B] at 215 (noting that “it is incorrect to state that the
first person who uses force is always the aggressor”). See also State v. Jimenez, 636 A.2d
782, 785 (Conn. 1994) (“It is not the law . . . that the person who first uses physical force is
necessarily the initial aggressor”).
108 State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 431, 452 (Conn. 2015).
109 See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
110 For example, if Patricia McCloskey had been prosecuted in a state that requires an initial
aggressor to be acting unlawfully and law enforcement had not discovered that the gun she
pointed at protesters was operable at one time and then altered to make it inoperable, she
would be able to escape initial aggressor status. McCloskey was charged under section 4 of
the unlawful use of a weapon statute, which requires that the weapon in question be capable
of lethal use. MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (4) (West 2020) (prohibiting the exhibiting a
weapon capable of lethal use in an “angry or threatening manner.”). The McCloskeys “told
police the pistol was inoperable.” Christine Byers, Indictments show St. Louis prosecutors
allege McCloskeys altered gun to “obstruct” prosecution, KSDK (updated Oct. 9,
2020), https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/crime/indictments-show-st-louis-prosecutorsallege-mccloskeys-altered-gun-to-obstruct-prosecution/63-7eb9928d-1ff5-4033-86e2c8ce387792f2 (https://perma.cc/D8KD-Q27K). Law enforcement authorities later
discovered that the gun was inoperable because someone had altered it to make it
inoperable. Id. Consequently, “tampering with evidence” charges were added to the
“unlawful use of a weapon” charges against the McCloskeys. Id.
111 Such threats in open-carry environments have been noted as tools of intimidation used by
white supremacists and others. See, e.g., David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly
Displayed Firearms, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesvillecould-have-been-graver/537087/ (https://perma.cc/4SZ6-FNUT); Prohibit Open Carry,
EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, https://www.everytown.org/solutions/prohibit-open-carry/.
107

28

FIREARMS AND INITIAL AGGRESSORS

29

Some jurisdictions are very minimalistic in defining those who
will be considered initial aggressors and simply impose a clean hands
rule, providing that one who is not “free from fault” will lose the right
to claim self-defense.112 A “free from fault” rule can be interpreted very
broadly and make it very easy for someone to be considered an initial
aggressor. A could mutter a snide remark about B under his breath, and
B, a hot-headed individual might respond by viciously attacking A with
a knife, causing A to have to defend himself. A, who arguably brought
about the difficulty by muttering the snide remark under his breath and
was not free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, could be denied
the ability to claim he acted in self-defense in a state that requires one
to be free from fault.
Most courts recognize there can be more than one “initial
aggressor” in a conflict.113 There are at least two ways in which there
can be more than one initial aggressor in a conflict. First, the victim
could be the first to use nondeadly force, and thus be considered an
initial nondeadly aggressor,114 and the defendant might respond with
deadly force, making the defendant the initial deadly aggressor.115 The
initial nondeadly aggressor will often have the right to use deadly force
in self-defense if the other person reacted to his use or threat of
nondeadly force with deadly force.116 Second, there can be two deadly
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 993 So. 2d 45, 47 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (“Generally, the
party invoking the doctrine of self-defense must be ‘entirely free’ from fault”) (citing
Kilgore v. State, 643 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Ala. Crim. App.1993); Brewer v. State, 49 So. 336,
338 (Ala. 1909) (“the accused must be wholly free from fault in provoking the difficulty”);
State v. Zamora, 681 P.2d 921, 924 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (“One who is at fault in provoking
a difficulty which necessitates his use of force may not rely upon a plea of self-defense to
justify or excuse his conduct”); State v. Stevenson, 188 A. 750, 751 (Del. Oyer & Term.
1936) (noting that one who kills another, to be justified or excused, must have been without
fault in provoking the difficulty). Somewhat similarly, Louisiana defines an aggressor as
one “who brings on a difficulty.” LA. REV. STAT. §14:21 (2020) (“[a] person who is the
aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he
withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or
should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict.”) (emphasis added).
113 People v. Peterson, 652 N.E.2d 1252, 1261-62 (Ill. Ct. App 1995) (finding defendant and
victim “were both aggressors”); Farrow v. State, 437 P.3d 809 (Wyo. 2019) (“in addition to
[defendant] or [victim] being the first aggressor, it is possible that they were both aggressors
or that neither one was. . . [I]f both were aggressors, ‘[o]ur case law also provides that two
individuals who mutually agree to fight are both considered aggressors, making a selfdefense theory unavailable to either of them.’”).
114 DRESSLER, supra note 49, §18.01[B][1] at 215 (noting that “a person is an aggressor even
if he merely starts a nondeadly conflict”).
115 Id. at §18.01[B][2][b] 215-16 (noting that where D wrongfully attempts nondeadly force
upon V and V improperly responds with deadly force, courts are not uniform as to whether
the initial nondeadly aggressor immediately regains the right to act in self-defense). For
example, in People v. De Oca, 506 N.E.2d 332 (Ill. App. 1992), the appellate court
acknowledged that “the victim and his cousin, Jesus Delgadello, instigated the initial
confrontation.” Id. at 367. After the fist fight ended, however, the defendant displayed a
loaded shotgun, shouted at the crowd, and then shot the victim. Id. at 368. The appellate
court found that “the trial court did not err in finding that the defendant was the aggressor at
the time of the shooting.” Id.
116 See DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 18.02[B][2][b] (noting that “[s]ome courts provide that
when the victim of a nondeadly assault responds with deadly force, the original aggressor
immediately regains his right of self-defense” while other courts say that “D is not entitled
112
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initial aggressors if, for example, both the defendant and the victim use
or threaten deadly force upon the other117 or agree to engage in mutual
combat.118 One court, however, has suggested that there can only be one
“initial aggressor” to a conflict.119

C.

Standard of Proof Necessary to Get an Initial Aggressor
Instruction to the Jury

Very little has been written on the standard of proof needed for
a jury instruction on the initial aggressor limitation on the defense of
self-defense. Those courts that have opined on this issue appear to
impose a fairly low bar. For example, Colorado courts apply the same
standard for the giving of an initial aggressor instruction that is required
for the giving of a jury instruction on an affirmative defense, requiring
just “some evidence” to support an initial aggressor instruction.120
Missouri courts have stated that “[t]he only time an initial aggressor
instruction should not be given is when there is absolutely no evidence that
the defendant was the initial aggressor.121 Similarly, Illinois courts have
indicated that courts should give the jury an initial aggressor instruction
along with an instruction on self-defense whenever there is conflicting
evidence regarding whether the defendant was the initial aggressor
because this enables the jury “to resolve the issue on either
hypothesis.”122
D.

Jury Decides Whether the Defendant Was the Initial
Aggressor and Loses the Right to Claim Self-Defense

It appears undisputed that whether the defendant was the initial
aggressor is a question of fact for the jury to decide.123 Nonetheless, the
to use deadly force against V unless and until he withdraws from the affray by availing
himself of an obviously safe retreat”).
117 ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(c) (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704 (3)(c) (2020); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-21(b)(3) (2020); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(g)(3) (2020); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-05-03(2)(b) (2021).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
119 People v. Beasley, 778 P.2d 304 (Colo. App. Ct 1989) (providing that it was error to give
an initial aggressor instruction when another individual, not the defendant, actually started
the conflict).
120 Castillo v. People, 421 P.3d 1141 (Colo. 2018) (assuming without deciding that the
appellate division applied the correct standard when it said there must be “some evidence”
to support the initial aggressor exception).
121 State v. Burns, 292 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
122 People v. Santiago, 515 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Ill. 1987) (holding trial court did not err in
giving initial aggressor instruction because jury was also given jury instruction on selfdefense and “was thereby enabled to resolve the issue on either hypothesis”).
123 DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 18.02[B][1] (“the issue of whether a defendant is the
aggressor ordinarily is a matter for the jury to decide, based on a proper instruction on the
meaning of the term”); People v. Edmondson, 767 N.E.2d 445, 449 (Ill. App. 2002)
(“Identifying the initial aggressor is a question of fact for the jury to resolve”); Widdison v.
State, 410 P.3d 1205, 1214 (W.Y. 2018) (“The identity of the initial aggressor, however,
was a question of fact upon which the jury was instructed”).
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judge acts as a de facto gatekeeper and can prevent the jury from
considering this question. This is because the decision whether to give
or withhold an initial aggressor instruction rests entirely within the trial
court’s discretion.124 If the judge personally believes the defendant was
not the initial aggressor, the judge can refuse to give an initial aggressor
instruction to the jury and the jury will not get to weigh the facts and
decide whether the defendant was the initial aggressor. Even if the trial
judge does not personally side with the defendant on this issue, the
judge may be incentivized not to give an initial aggressor instruction out
of fear that if convicted, the defendant will appeal the ruling and that
ruling may be reversed on appeal.125
When judges refuse to give an initial aggressor instruction in
cases when there is sufficient evidence to support the giving of the
instruction, juries are prohibited from exercising their decision making
authority over this critically important issue. To resolve this state of
affairs, legislatures can and should step in to clarify the law in this
regard. A clear rule requiring that an initial aggressor instruction be
given whenever there is some evidence to support such an instruction
would go a long way to ensure that juries can exercise their decision
making authority on the question of whether a defendant was the initial
aggressor in a particular case.
II.

WHAT ELSE IS WRONG WITH CURRENT INITIAL
AGGRESSOR RULES?

In addition to the problems identified in the previous section,
another problem with current initial aggressor rules is that they are
confoundingly ambiguous. Michael Mannheimer put it well when he
stated, “I have always found [the question of what one has to do to be
considered the initial aggressor] to be one of the most maddeningly
indeterminate questions of criminal law.”126
In this Part, I examine two high-profile cases to show just how
ambiguous—and confusing—the initial aggressor rules really are. If the
rules on initial aggressors are confusing to legal scholars, they
undoubtedly are equally confusing to laypersons serving as jurors.
A.

Kyle Rittenhouse and Wisconsin’s Initial Aggressor
Rule

124

Brooks, supra note 42, at 362, citing Campbell v. State, 812 So. 2d 540, 543 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (“[t]he decision of the trial court to give or withhold a proposed jury
instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard”).
125 See, e.g., Castillo v. People, 421 P.3d 1141, 1145 (2018) (holding trial court’s decision to
give an initial aggressor instruction to the jury was in error).
126 Michael Mannheimer, Trayvon Martin and the Initial Aggressor Issue, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Mar. 26, 2012), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/03/trayvon-martin-andthe-initial-aggressor-issue.html (https://perma.cc/5WHE-964F).
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Wisconsin’s self-defense law and its initial aggressor rule
garnered national attention after Kyle Rittenhouse, a 17-year-old White
teenager, traveled to Kenosha, Wisconsin in August 2020 with an AR15 style rifle on the third night of racial justice protests over the police
shooting of Jacob Blake, and ended up shooting and killing two men
and seriously injuring another.127 Rittenhouse, who was charged with
murder, manslaughter, and other counts, claimed he shot the men in
self-defense.128
One question that loomed large in the background throughout
Rittenhouse’s trial was whether the judge would give the jury an initial
aggressor instruction. The prosecution wanted such an instruction
because it would allow them to argue that Rittenhouse provoked the
violence and therefore could not legitimately claim to have acted in selfdefense. The defense was opposed to such an instruction because they
did not want the jury thinking about the ways in which Rittenhouse’s
own actions may have created the need for him to fire his weapon,
undermining Rittenhouse’s claim of self-defense.
Just before closing arguments, the judge ruled that he would
give the jury a provocation instruction.129 This was seen as a significant
victory for the government for it allowed Assistant District Attorney
Thomas Binger to argue during closing statements that by bringing a
firearm to Kenosha, Rittenhouse was the aggressor and lost his right to
act in self-defense.130 As Binger explained to the jury, “You cannot
claim self-defense against a danger you create. That's critical right
here. If you're the one who is threatening others, you lose the right to
claim self-defense.”131
The prosecution’s closing argument was quite powerful. If one
had just listened to that closing argument and no other part of the trial,
one might have been inclined to vote to convict. Prior to closing
arguments, however, the prosecution had not done a very convincing
job of explaining why Rittenhouse should be convicted of the crimes he
was charged with. Several prosecution witnesses made statements when
they were cross-examined by Rittenhouse’s attorney that helped

127

Therault & Armus, supra note 43; Haley Willis, Muyi Xiao, Christiaan Triebert,
Christoph Koettl, Stella Cooper, David Botti, John Ismay, & Ainara Tiefenthäle, Tracking
the Suspect in the Fatal Kenosha Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2020) (updated Nov. 16,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/us/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shootingvideo.html (https://perma.cc/KM2R-WDV5).
128
Todd Richmond, Assoc. Press, These Are The Charges Kyle Rittenhouse Faces In The
Kenosha Shooting, PBS.ORG (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/apexplainer-what-charges-does-kyle-rittenhouse-face (https://perma.cc/FJM9-W6DR).
129 Kim Bellware, Jury In Rittenhouse Trial Can Consider Lesser Charges And Whether He
Provoked Attack, Judge Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/11/14/rittenhouse-jury-instructions/
(https://perma.cc/LCQ4-BRMN).
130 Mike Hayes, Prosecution Argues Rittenhouse Can’t Claim Self-Defense on "A Danger
You Create," CNN (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/us/live-news/kyle-rittenhousetrial-11-15-21/h_038b4f7b62cb201f5d971f020ec21d1c (https://perma.cc/3YV2-Z4CB).
131 Id.
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Rittenhouse’s claim of self-defense.132 For example, when Gaige
Grosskreutz, the sole surviving person shot by Rittenhouse, was on the
stand, he admitted on cross-examination that he pointed a gun at
Rittenhouse before Rittenhouse shot him.133 Grosskreutz later
backtracked and said he did not point his gun at Rittenhouse during a
TV interview with Good Morning America following his testimony,134
but the jury didn’t hear this. They only heard his testimony in court.
And when Rittenhouse took the stand to testify in his own defense,
Binger’s 3-hour cross examination of Rittenhouse was long and
rambling, and it was not obvious what points he was trying to get
across to the jury.135
The jury instruction on provocation, which the judge read to
the jury along with 36 pages of other jury instructions after closing
arguments, itself was not a model of clarity.136 After reading the
standard jury instruction on retreat, which basically told the jury that
Rittenhouse had no duty to retreat even though provocateurs in
Wisconsin do have a duty to retreat,137 the judge told the jury:
You should also consider whether the defendant provoked the
attack. A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type
likely to provoke others to attack, and who does provoke an
attack, is not allowed to use or threaten force in self-defense
against that attack. However, if the attack which follows causes
the person reasonably to believe that he is in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm, he may lawfully act in selfdefense. But the person may not use or threaten force intended
or likely to cause death unless he reasonably believes he has
exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or
otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm.138
132

Michael Tarm, Explainer: Did State's Own Witnesses Hurt Rittenhouse Case?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/202111-10/explainer-did-states-own-witnesses-hurt-rittenhouse-case (https://perma.cc/2WX74KC5).
133 Becky Sullivan, The Only Person Who Survived Being Shot By Kyle Rittenhouse Takes
The Stand, NPR (updated Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/08/1053567574/kylerittenhouse-trial-gaige-grosskreutz-testimony-kenosha (https://perma.cc/48K8-DQBQ).
134 Gaige Grosskreutz Gives 1st Interview Since Testifying In Rittenhouse Trial, ABC NEWS
GMA (Good Morning America) (Nov. 11, 2021) (3:07-3:15; 3:31-3:40),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oocNVvTHP5M (https://perma.cc/GL4T-N68H).
135 Full Video: Prosecutors Cross-Examine Kyle Rittenhouse (Nov. 11, 2021) (3 hour-long
video of prosecutor’s cross examination of Kyle Rittenhouse),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JG8PhtFrO0Y (https://perma.cc/M8PS-SH4B).
136 Instructions to the Jury, State v. Rittenhouse (Case No. 20 CF 893) (Nov. 15, 2021)
(copy on file with author); Read the Jury Instructions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/11/17/us/rittenhouse-trial-jury-instructions.html
(https://perma.cc/WT3Z-US5P).
137 See Instructions to the Jury, State v. Rittenhouse, infra note 138 (providing that “the
[provocateur] may not use or threaten force intended or likely to cause death unless he
reasonably believes he has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or
otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm”).
138 Instructions to the Jury, State v. Rittenhouse (Case No. 20 CF 893) (Nov. 15, 2021)
(copy on file with author).
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If one reads Wisconsin’s provocation instruction closely, one
sees that unlike initial aggressor instructions in other states, Wisconsin’s
instruction doesn’t actually prohibit an initial aggressor or provocateur
from arguing self-defense.139 While initially suggesting that a person
who provokes an attack against him cannot use or threaten force in
self-defense against that attack, the instruction immediately follows by
saying that a person may act lawfully in self-defense if the attack he
provoked140 causes him to reasonably believe he is in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm.141 But this is simply the law of selfdefense without the provocation instruction. Instead of taking selfdefense off the table, all Wisconsin’s provocation instruction does is to
impose a duty to retreat on one who provokes an attack142 where nonaggressors have no duty to retreat.
Another problem with Wisconsin’s provocation provision is
that it comes into play only if the defendant engaged in “unlawful
conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack.”143 Wisconsin law
makes the possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under the age
of 18 a misdemeanor offense.144 The government probably planned to
argue that Rittenhouse was engaged in unlawful conduct by being in
possession of a firearm in Wisconsin when he was just 17-years-old and
that bringing an AR-15-style rifle to a tense racial justice protest was
conduct likely to provoke others to attack. Indeed, the government had
charged Rittenhouse with possession of a dangerous weapon by a
minor and this charge would have allowed them to argue that
Rittenhouse was engaged in unlawful conduct of a type likely to

139

See Cynthia Lee, How a Vaguely Worded Wisconsin Law Could Let Rittenhouse Walk,
POLITICO (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/11/17/wisconsinself-defense-law-rittenhouse-522814 (https://perma.cc/SST8-RW3X).
140 Interestingly, even though Wisconsin’s self-defense statute requires an intent to provoke,
the instruction on provocation that the judge chose to give to the jury did not tell the jury
that Rittenhouse must have provoked the victim to attack him with the intent of using such
attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to the other person. See WIS. STAT. §
939.48(2)(c) (2021) (providing “[a] person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or
unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great
bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.”)
(emphasis added). The judge’s provocation instruction largely tracked Wisconsin’s model
provocation instruction except it did not include language providing that the defendant must
have intended to provoke the victim into attacking him in order to use the attack as an
excuse to counterattack. See 815 WIS. JI CRIM (providing as optional language “A person
who provokes an attack whether by lawful or unlawful conduct with intent to use such an
attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to another person is not entitled to
use or threaten force in selfdefense.”) (sic).
141 Id.
142 Instructions to the Jury, State v. Rittenhouse (Case No. 20 CF 893) (Nov. 15, 2021)
(“But the person may not use or threaten force intended or likely to cause death unless he
reasonably believes he has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or
otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm.”).
143 Id.
144 WIS. STAT. § 948.60(2)(a).

34

FIREARMS AND INITIAL AGGRESSORS

35

provoke others to attack.145 Just before closing arguments, however, the
judge dismissed this weapons charge on the ground that it was only
unlawful to possess a rifle as a minor only if the rifle was short-barreled
and the AR-15 Rittenhouse had was long-barreled.146
The government may have planned to argue in the alternative
that Rittenhouse was engaged in unlawful conduct by being in Kenosha
after curfew, but the judge also dismissed the violation of curfew charge
on the ground that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence that
a lawful order for a curfew was in effect that night.147 Apparently, the
judge did not think a police officer’s testimony that a curfew order was
in effect was sufficient proof of a curfew order148 despite that fact that
at least 150 peaceful protesters had been arrested over nine days
following the shooting of Jacob Blake under this curfew order.149 If the
jury was looking for some unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke
others to attack, these rulings made it challenging for them to find such
unlawful conduct.
In the end, the jury acquitted Rittenhouse of all charges.150 If
Rittenhouse had been Black, had brought an AR-15 style rifle to a
White nationalist rally, and had shot three White individuals at that
rally, killing two of them, it is hard to imagine a jury returning a verdict
of not guilty on all charges.

145

Todd Richmond, Assoc. Press, These are the charges Kyle Rittenhouse faces in the
Kenosha shooting, PBS.org (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/apexplainer-what-charges-does-kyle-rittenhouse-face (https://perma.cc/FJM9-W6DR).
146 Scott Bauer, Michael Tarm, & Amy Forliti, Judge at Rittenhouse Trial Dismisses Charge
of Possession of Dangerous Weapon, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2021),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/nov/15/judge-at-kyle-rittenhouse-trialdismisses-charge-o/ (https://perma.cc/U7F7-V5NR).
147 Aaron Keller, Judge Dismisses Count Accusing Kyle Rittenhouse of Violating Curfew
Because State Presented Insufficient Evidence, MSN NEWS (Nov. 9, 2021),
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/judge-dismisses-count-accusing-kyle-rittenhouseof-violating-curfew-because-state-presented-insufficient-evidence/ar-AAQvKpH
(https://perma.cc/4WBM-PAX3).
148 Id.
149 Melissa Alonso, Sara Sidner and Eliott C. McLaughlin, Kenosha Protesters Arrested for
Breaking Curfew While Police Supporters Were Allowed to 'Roam,' Lawsuit Says, CNN
(Sept. 2, 2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/02/us/kenosha-curfew-lawsuit-protestsjacob-blake/index.html (https://perma.cc/YT9J-BZZL).
150 Clare Hymes, Kyle Rittenhouse Found Not Guilty of All Charges in Kenosha Shootings,
CBS NEWS (Nov. 19, 2021), https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/kyle-rittenhouseverdict-acquitted-all-charges/ (https://perma.cc/FL5D-WTRX). I am not suggesting that the
jury’s verdict was completely unsupported by the evidence. Joseph Rosenbaum was chasing
Rittenhouse and had lunged toward Rittenhouse just before Rittenhouse shot him. Therault
& Armus, supra note 43. Anthony Huber had hit Rittenhouse with a skateboard while
Rittehnouse was on the ground and tried to grab Rittenhouse’s gun before Rittenhouse shot
him. Id. And Gaige Grosskreutz had approached Rittenhouse with a handgun in his right
hand with the intent of disarming Rittenhouse and admitted on the stand that Rittenhouse
didn’t shoot him until after he pointed his firearm at Rittenhouse. Sullivan, supra note 133.
Grosskreutz later walked back this statement in a TV interview with Good Morning
Amerca, see Gaige Grosskreutz Gives 1st Interview Since Testifying In Rittenhouse Trial,
supra note 134, but the jury only heard what he said on the witness stand.
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George Zimmerman and Florida’s Initial Aggressor
Rule

Wisconsin’s provocation instruction is just one example of how
confusing the rules surrounding the initial aggressor doctrine can be.
Another example can be found in a case involving the shooting of a
young Black teen named Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman.
Zimmerman was the Neighborhood Watch Captain who shot and
killed Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida on February 26, 2012.151 Just
minutes before the shooting, Zimmerman had called 911 to report “a
real suspicious guy.”152 Zimmerman told the dispatcher that it looked
like the suspicious guy was up to no good or was on drugs.153 After
finding out that Zimmerman was following Martin in his vehicle, the
911 dispatcher told Zimmerman “Okay, we don’t need you to do
that.”154
Despite this suggestion that he stop following Martin and wait
for police to arrive, Zimmerman got out of his vehicle, followed Martin
on foot, and then confronted Martin, who was returning to his father’s
home after going to the store to buy some Skittles for his nephew.155
Within two minutes of getting off the phone with 911, Zimmerman
had shot and killed Martin.156 Zimmerman told police he shot Martin in
self-defense, and was released without any charges.157 It was only after
thousands of people donned hoodies and held candlelight vigils to
demand Zimmerman's arrest that Zimmerman was finally arrested and
charged with murder.158
Trial courts have complete discretion over whether to give an
initial aggressor instruction to the jury. In the Zimmerman case, even
though the prosecution asked for an initial aggressor instruction, the
trial court declined to give such an instruction.159
151

Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet PostRacial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2013).
152 Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race
and Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at Al.
153 Melanie Jones, Trayvon Martin Case: 911 Tapes 'Not as Conclusive as People Think,'
Says Defense Attorney, INT'L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2012, 2:56 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/trayvon-martin-case-911-tapes-not-concl usive-people-thinksays-defense-a ttorney-429306.
154 Barry, supra note 152.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Zimmerman said that after he spoke with Martin, Martin ran off, but then doubled back
and surprised Zimmerman, punched him, got him on the ground, and was smashing his head
against the concrete. Id. Zimmerman said that he shot Martin because Martin was reaching
for Zimmerman’s gun and he thought Martin was going to kill him. Id.
158 NAACP Leads March on Sanford, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2012, at A3; Ovetta Wiggins, A
Rallying Cry for Justice in Teen's Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2012, at A3.
159 See Alanna D. Coopersmith, Were the jury instructions in George Zimmerman trial
correct?, EAST BAY DEFENSE (July 18, 2013), https://www.eastbaydefense.com/blogpost/incorrect-jury-instructions-in-the-zimmerman-trial/; Ola
Abiose, George Zimmerman Verdict Hinged On Definition Of 2 Words, MIC (July 17,
2013), https://www.mic.com/articles/55195/george-zimmerman-verdict-hinged-ondefinition-of-2-words.
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Florida’s initial aggressor rule, like Wisconsin’s, is hardly a
model of clarity.160 As Michael Mannheimer observes, “Florida Stat. sec.
776.041(2) is decidedly ambiguous on what an aggressor is: it provides
that the right of self-defense is ‘not available to a person who [i]nitially
provokes the use of force against himself . . . .’ ”161 Mannheimer
continues:
The critical word there is “provokes.” “Provokes” might imply
that some intent to precipitate violence is necessary. On the
other hand, “provokes” can be read more broadly as simply
triggering a violent response without intent that it occur, as
when, in the classic voluntary manslaughter example, a wife
“provokes” a fatal attack by her husband when he catches her
in the arms of her lover, even if she did not expect to be
discovered. The problem with this broad a reading is that one
could be said to be the initial aggressor even by engaging in
behavior that is entirely innocent, such as by asking a passerby
for a handout, or even constitutionally protected, such as by
telling the passerby that he practices a false religion and will
burn in hell for it.162
Concerning Zimmerman, Mannheimer asks, “[D]oes following
someone, even with the intent only to ask questions, render
Zimmerman the ‘initial aggressor?’163 Mannheimer would answer this
question in the negative, explaining, “To me, the word ‘provokes’
encompasses something more than asking another person questions,
even [if] one has to follow him down the street to do so.”164
Legal scholars, however, were not of one mind on this question.
In a provocative Huffington Post article, Alafair Burke wrote, “A
properly instructed jury should have heard the complete law of selfdefense in Florida, not just the portions that helped Zimmerman.” 165
“Had the jury been instructed about the initial aggressor exception, it
might have concluded that Zimmerman's following of Martin, though
itself not criminal, was reasonably apprehended by Martin as a ‘threat of
Florida provides by statute that the justification of self-defense “is not available to a
person who: (2) [i]nitially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or
herself, unless: (a) [s]uch force or threat of force is so great that the person reasonably
believes that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that he or
she has exhausted every reasonable means to escape such danger other than the use or
threatened use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the assailant;
or (b) [i]n good faith, the person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and
indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she desires to withdraw and terminate the use or
threatened use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use or threatened use of
force.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.041(2) (2020).
161 Mannheimer, Trayvon Martin and the Initial Aggressor Issue, supra note 126.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Alafair Burke, What You May Not Know About the Zimmerman Verdict: The Evolution
of a Jury Instruction, HUFFPOST (July 15, 2013), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/georgezimmerman-jury-instructions_b_3596685 (https://perma.cc/MH2X-R9Z2).
160
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force.’”166 “Put another way,” Burke explained, “the jury might have
concluded that Martin was the one acting in self-defense during the
physical confrontation that preceded the gunshot, making Zimmerman
the aggressor.”
Similarly, Jeffrey Fagan opined, “Whether George Zimmerman
was the initial aggressor, or the provocateur of the incident, and
whether he forfeited his self-defense claim by failing to withdraw from
the confrontation with Trayvon Martin . . . should have been matters
for the jury to decide.”167 Fagan notes that “following the summations,
Judge Debra Nelson did not give an initial aggressor jury instruction,
basically leaving it up to the jury to decide whether these facts
matter[ed], how much, and in what way.”168 He concludes that the
judge’s “decision to not instruct the jury to consider this part of the
law . . . may have contaminated the verdict by obscuring a crucial piece
of the law.”169
Likewise, Marjorie Cohn observed, “The jury was only given
partial instructions on self-defense – those parts that helped
Zimmerman.” 170 “They were prevented from considering whether
Zimmerman might have been the first aggressor, which would have
negated his claim of self-defense.”171
In contrast, Cynthia Ward argued that “under the "initial
aggressor" doctrine . . . a defender is not deemed a provocateur for
purposes of asserting self-defense unless the defender ‘makes the first
move’ to assault, or attempt to assault, the other person.”172 Because
Martin made the first move at least according to Zimmerman (no one
else was there to witness what actually happened since Martin died after
being shot by Zimmerman), Martin, not Zimmerman, was the initial
aggressor. Ward concludes, “Whether one believes that George
Zimmerman used good or bad judgment in following Trayvon Martin
on the night that Martin died, Zimmerman’s proven behavior almost
certainly does not qualify him as the ‘initial aggressor.’”173
In the end, Zimmerman was acquitted of all charges.174 It is
unclear what the jury would have done had it received an initial
166

Id.
Jeffrey A Fagan, The Zimmerman Verdict and the Initial Aggressor Exception, COLUM.
L. SCH. MAG. (Fall 2013), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/zimmerman-verdictand-initial-aggressor-exception (https://perma.cc/93VC-5NGZ).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Marjorie Cohn, Key Mistakes Sway Jury in Zimmerman Trial, TRUTHOUT (July 17,
2013), https://truthout.org/articles/zimmerman-vs-martin-racial-profiling-and-self-defense/
(https://perma.cc/3QXZ-UJEY).
171 Id.
172 Ward, supra note 21, at 115.
173 Ward, supra note 21, at 115.
174 Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley, Zimmerman Is Acquitted in Trayvon Martin Killing,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmermanverdict-trayvon-martin.html (https://perma.cc/S7DF-ZFXH). If Zimmerman had been Black
and Trayvon Martin had been White, it is difficult to imagine the jury coming back with a
not guilty verdict. Pulling out a gun and shooting someone who is beating you in a fistfight
does not seem to be a reasonable act in self-defense.
167
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aggressor instruction, but whether or not Zimmerman was the
aggressor should have been for the jury to decide. Instead, because the
judge declined to give an initial aggressor instruction to the jury, the
jury was not permitted to consider the issue.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

In 2020 and 2021, while this nation was battling COVID-19,
the virus that had caused over 800,000 deaths and 7.5 million
hospitalizations by the end of 2021,175 the nation witnessed many
incidents in which individuals became physically violent176 after simply
being asked to comply with mask mandates designed to stop the spread
of COVID.177 Some anti-maskers didn’t just threaten violence but
175

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), between February
2020 and September 2021, there were 921,000 total deaths and 7.5 million hospitalizations
due to COVID-19. Estimated COVID-19 Burden, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (Nov. 16, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/casesupdates/burden.html (https://perma.cc/A4BL-FL22). See also Becky Sullivan, New Study
Estimates More Than 900,000 People Have Died Of COVID-19 In U.S., NPR (May 6,
2021), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2021/05/06/994287048/newstudy-estimates-more-than-900-000-people-have-died-of-covid-19-in-u-s () (reporting on a
study by the University of Washington's Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation that
found that from March 2020 through May 3, 2021, “the number of people who . . . died of
COVID-19 in the U.S. [was] more than 900,000, a number 57% higher than official
figures”).
176 In Des Moines, Iowa, for example, when one customer at a Vision 4 Less store asked
another customer to wear his mask over his nose, the unmasked customer followed the
masked customer outside the store and assaulted him in the parking lot, jabbing him in the
eye and repeatedly kneeing him in the groin. Isabella Grullón Paz, Iowa Man is Sentenced to
10 Years in Prison After Mask Fight, N.Y. Times (June 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/14/us/iowa-mask-fight-shane-michael.html
(https://perma.cc/DNJ5-BVXZ) (reporting that after the unmasked customer had the masked
customer on the ground, he spat and coughed on the other man while shouting, “If I have it
[COVID-19], you have it!”). In another case, an 80-year-old man was pushed to the ground
by a fellow customer a bar in Buffalo, New York after he asked that customer at to wear a
mask. Troy Closson, 80-Year-Old Is Killed After Asking Bar Patron to Wear Mask, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/nyregion/face-mask-criminallynegligent-homicide.html (https://perma.cc/9YUZ-DL5N). The 80-year-old man died 5 days
later from his injuries. Id. Neil MacFarquhar, Who’s Enforcing Mask Rules? Often Retail
Workers, and They’re Getting Hurt, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/coronavirus-masks-violence.html
(https://perma.cc/47LE-C5BK) (reporting numerous incidents in which store employees
have been attacked by customers refusing to wear a mask). Jaclyn Peiser, A Florida Dad
Tried to Enter A School Maskless. When a Student Confronted Him, He Assaulted Her,
Police Said, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/08/26/florida-man-anti-mask-dan-bauman/
(https://perma.cc/D6C9-YW2G) (reporting numerous incidents in which individuals
opposed to masks became violent after being asked to wear a mask).
177 Gary Detman, Man accused of pulling gun on father, daughter at Walmart arrested,
CBS12 NEWS (July 23, 2020) (reporting that while inside a Walmart in Palm Beach County,
Florida, a man with a concealed carry permit pulled a handgun from his waistband and
aimed it at a fellow customer and his daughter after the customer told the unmasked man to
put on a mask), https://cbs12.com/news/local/man-who-pulled-gun-on-father-daughter-atwalmart-arrested (https://perma.cc/AD5W-CZUT); Ewan Palmer, Florida Man Who Pulled
Gun on Walmart Shopper in Mask Row Identified, NEWSWEEK (July 16, 2020) (showing
photo of unmasked man brandishing a firearm at Walmart store),
https://www.newsweek.com/florida-walmart-mask-gun-1518201 (https://perma.cc/M95A-
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ended up pulling out firearms and shooting store employees or
customers after being asked to wear a mask or to wear a mask
properly.178
During the pandemic, the United States also saw an alarming
increase in unruly passengers on commercial flights.179 Many of these
unruly passengers resorted to physical violence against flight attendants
who asked them to wear a mask or wear their mask properly.180 At the
URQW); Tom Batchelor, Target Shopper Pulls Gun After Being Told to Wear Mask, Police
Say, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 3, 2020) (a man who was asked to put on a mask by two female
employees at a Target store in Morgan Hill, California, became agitated and pulled a gun
from his pocket), https://www.newsweek.com/target-shopper-gun-wear-face-mask-police1552134 (https://perma.cc/3XUQ-SP2H); Matthew Ormseth, Unmasked gunman robs food
from kitchen of Roscoe’s in Pasadena, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2021) (reporting that an
unmasked man at a Roscoe’s House of Chicken and Waffle in Pasadena, California pulled
out a gun and pointed it at a restaurant employee after the employee told him he needed to
wear a mask), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-02-03/unmasked-man-entersroscoes-house-of-chicken-and-waffles-shows-a-gun-and-steals-food
(https://perma.cc/D2V4-8C69); Lauren Abbate, Man allegedly displays gun after being told
to wear mask in Maine Dunkin', CBS13-WGME (July 29, 2020) (an unmasked man inside a
Dunkin’ Donuts store in Rockland, Maine, pulled up his shirt to display a handgun on his
waist when a fellow customer pointed out that he wasn’t wearing a mask as mandated when
inside businesses to deter the spread of COVID), https://wgme.com/news/coronavirus/manallegedly-displays-gun-after-being-told-to-wear-mask-in-maine-dunkin
(https://perma.cc/B47A-9JXK).
178 In one case, a man wearing a mask improperly inside a Decatur, Georgia supermarket
while masks were still mandated was asked to pull up his mask by a female cashier. The
man refused, walked out of the store without paying for his items, then came back in and
shot and killed the cashier who had asked him to mask up. Zack Linly, Black Female
Cashier Fatally Shot in Georgia After Asking Customer to Adjust His Face Mask, THE ROOT
(June 6, 2021), https://www.theroot.com/black-female-cashier-fatally-shot-in-georgia-afteraski-1847114915 (https://perma.cc/XR69-WB3S); Jon Shirek, Store owner: Customer
shoots, kills cashier who asked him to pull up his face mask, 11ALIVE-WXIA (June 16,
2021), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/crime/store-owner-customer-shoots-killscashier-over-mask/85-8f709a03-6e85-4577-b117-2eabc17ecf55 (https://perma.cc/RAA9CJFX). In another case, a group of men pulled up to a sports bar in Fayetteville, North
Carolina, and attempted to enter the bar without face masks. The unmasked men argued
with security and a fight between masked patrons and the unmasked men broke out. Both
sides pulled out guns. One of the unmasked men shot a security guard who attempted to
break up the fight. CBS 17 Digital Desk, Fayetteville man arrested after shooting over face
mask rule critically injures security guard, CBS 17-WSPA (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://www.wspa.com/news/crime/fayetteville-man-arrested-after-shooting-over-facemask-rule-critically-injures-security-guard/(https://perma.cc/NMH7-G878).
179 Rich Mendez, Disputes Over Mask Mandates Comprise 75% of FAA’s Unruly-Passenger
Complaints on Planes, CNBC.COM (July 6, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/06/disputes-over-mask-mandates-comprise-75percent-offaas-unruly-passenger-complaints-on-planes-.html (https://perma.cc/L87U-LGD8) (noting
that “[t]he majority of the Federal Aviation Administration’s unruly-passenger reports on
airplanes stem from passengers who refuse to comply with mask mandates put in place to
guard against the spread of Covid-19”); Pete Muntean, FAA Has Sent Only 37 Unruly
Passenger Cases to DOJ, CNN (Nov. 4, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/04/politics/faa-unruly-passengers-doj/index.html
(https://perma.cc/GG2C-HXLX) (noting flight crews have reported over 5,000 incidents of
violence on commercial flights thus far in 2021, including an incident in which a man
claimed he acted in self-defense when he punched an American Airlines flight attendant
who was trying to keep him from reaching the lavatory while the seat belt sign was on).
180 Francesca Street, Dread at 30,000 Feet: Inside The Increasingly Violent World of US
Flight Attendants, CNN (updated Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/flightattendants-unruly-passengers-covid/index.html (https://perma.cc/L33J-3YAN) (noting that a
survey by the Association of Flight Attendants released in July 2021 found that of the 5,000
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same time, there was an unprecedented increase in the number of
individuals caught attempting to take firearms onto commercial flights,
which was and is against the law.181 In 2021, the Transportation Security
Administration intercepted 5,972 firearms at airport security
checkpoints.182 Roughly 80 percent of the guns confiscated by TSA in
2021 were loaded.183 One can only imagine what might have happened
in flight had these loaded firearms not been intercepted.
The United States has one of the highest rates of civilian gun
ownership in the world.184 According to a 2020 Gallup poll,
approximately 1 in every 3 adults in the United States own a firearm
and 44 percent of all adults live in a household with a gun.185
flight attendants surveyed, 85% reported dealing with unruly passengers in the first half of
2021, with 17% saying they had been the victim of a physical attack and that many of these
incidents are linked to mask non-compliance). In a recent Delta flight from Washington, DC
to Los Angeles, a maskless passenger assaulted a flight attendant and an Air Marshal after
being asked numerous times to wear a mask. Assoc. Press, Flight to LA Diverted To
Oklahoma Due to Unruly Passenger, ABC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/flight-la-diverted-oklahoma-due-unruly-passenger81671531 (https://perma.cc/J3LF-D4G2) (female passenger on same flight telling ABC
News in video clip that Pennington, the passenger who assaulted a flight attendant and an
Air Marshal, had refused to wear a mask). This incident was just one of the more than 5,500
reports of unruly passengers on commercial flights in 2021, the highest number the FAA has
seen since they began keeping track of such incidents in the mid-1990s. Eric Resendiz,
Delta Flight Diverted After Passenger Assaults Flight Attendant, Air Marshal, ABC13
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Dec. 10, 2021), https://abc13.com/delta-flight-attendant-assaultedairlines-passenger-attacked/11319940/ (https://perma.cc/3QEQ-WJA2) (male passenger
who was sitting behind the unruly passenger reporting to ABC News that the flight crew
kept asking the unruly male passenger to wear a mask for an hour into the flight but the
passenger refused to wear a mask).
181 Kaia Hubbard, TSA Catching Record Number of Guns at Airport Checkpoints This Year,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct 14, 2021), https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/tsacatching-record-number-of-guns-at-airport-checkpoints-this-year/ar-AAPx4gt
(https://perma.cc/K868-5XLB) ) (reporting that “Transportation Security Administration
officers have detected a record number of firearms at airport security checkpoints so far in
2021, marking a 20-year high well before the year's end”).
182 Joe Davidson, Airline Passenger Traffic Dropped In The Pandemic. But TSA Seized
More Guns Than Ever, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/18/tsa-gun-seizures-airport-security/
(https://perma.cc/54GX-U3JD). This was an increase of more than one-third over the 4,432
guns found at airport security checkpoints in 2019, the second highest year for firearms
intercepted at airport security checkpoints. Id. The number of firearms found at airport
security checkpoints has increased more than six-fold since 2008. Id.
183 Kimberlee Speakman, Record Number of Guns Caught at TSA Checkpoints So Far This
Year, FORBES (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimberleespeakman/2021/10/13/record-number-of-gunscaught-at-tsa-checkpoints-so-far-this-year/?sh=5b40b1aa9717(https://perma.cc/R4KS374W) (noting that “[r]oughly 80% of the guns confiscated by TSA so far this year were
loaded”).
184 German Lopez, America’s love for guns, in one chart, Vox (June 21,
2018) https://www.vox.com/2018/6/21/17488024/gun-ownership-violence-shootings-us
(https://perma.cc/8YMG-NCAU), citing Aaron Karp, Estimating Global Civilian-Held
Firearms Numbers, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 3 (2018).
185 Lydia Saad, What Percentage of Americans Own Guns?, GALLUP (last updated Nov. 13,
2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/264932/percentage-americans-own-guns.aspx
(https://perma.cc/GV6L-5ZNL) (noting that “[t]hirty-two percent of U.S. adults say they
personally own a gun, while a larger percentage, 44%, report living in a gun household”);
John Shattuck & Mathias Risse, Reimagining Rights & Responsibilities in the United States:
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Importantly, America’s love of guns is not shared by all but is largely
marked by political party or ideology, location, gender, and to some
extent race.186 According to a 2020 Gallup poll, “Republicans (50%),
rural residents (48%), men (45%), self-identified conservatives (45%)
and Southerners (40%) are the most likely subgroups to say they
personally own a gun.”187 “Liberals (15%), Democrats (18%), nonWhite Americans (18%), women (19%) and Eastern residents (21%) are
the least likely to report personal gun ownership.”188
Gun ownership in the United States, however, jumped from 32
percent to 39 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic.189 Disturbingly,
many of those purchasing a firearm were first time gun buyers who
were not the typical fans of firearms.190 According to firearms industry
data, “sales jump[ed] 50 percent among Black customers, 47 percent
among Hispanics and 43 percent among Asian Americans, though gun
ownership remain[ed] proportionately lower among those groups
compared with Whites.”191 America’s love of—or at least tolerance
for—guns and gun ownership appears to be growing.192
On top of high private gun ownership, permissive laws allowing
gun owners to carry firearms in public are widespread.193 All fifty states
and the District of Columbia allow the concealed carry of firearms in

Gun Rights and Public Safety, Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper
Series 1, 3 (2021) (noting that “. . . 3 in every 10 Americans owns a gun”).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Marc Fisher, et al., ‘Fear on Top of Fear’: Why Anti-Gun Americans Joined the Wave of
New Gun Owners, WASH. POST (July 10, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2021/anti-gun-gun-owners/
(https://perma.cc/C4G4-49XA). The prevalence of guns may be one of the reasons why
there is so much lethal violence in the United States. German Lopez, America’s love for
guns, in one chart, VOX (June 21, 2018) https://www.vox.com/2018/6/21/17488024/gunownership-violence-shootings-us (https://perma.cc/8YMG-NCAU) (noting that when a
person with a loaded gun gets into an altercation with another person, “it’s much more likely
that [they] will . . . and be able to . . . kill someone.”).
190 Id.
191 Id., citing Jim Curcuruto, Firearm Ammunition Sales During 1st Half 2020: NSSF Survey
Reveals Broad Demographic Appeal For Firearm Purchases During Sales Surge Of 2020,
NSSF (July 21, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/articles/nssf-survey-reveals-broaddemographic-appeal-for-firearm-purchases-during-sales-surge-of-2020/
(https://perma.cc/9SP8-DFM6) (reporting that “approximately 90 percent of retailers
reported . . . seeing a 95 percent increase in firearm sales and a 139 percent increase in
ammunition sales over the same period in 2019”).
192 Tim Craig, As Gun Ownership Rises, Georgia Looks to Loosen Restrictions: It’s the
‘Wild, Wild West,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/03/24/columbus-gun-ownership-violence/
(https://perma.cc/9AKS-8FLU) (noting that “[f]irearm purchases have soared since the
beginning of the pandemic, particularly among first-time gun buyers”).
193 Joseph Blocher & Reva B. Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New
Account of Public Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2021) (“In the
last several decades the law of public carry has evolved to allow more forms of gun carry in
shared public spaces with less licensing”).
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public194 and forty-seven states allow the open carry of firearms in
public.195
The U.S. Supreme Court is poised to decide in 2022 whether
individuals have a constitutional right under the Second Amendment to
“bear” firearms in public.196 Given the current composition of the
Court, the Court is likely to extend its holding in Heller, in which the
Court held that individuals have a Second Amendment right to possess
firearms in the home for self-defense, and find that the Second
Amendment also confers a right to “bear” firearms in public for selfdefense.197
If the Court finds that the Second Amendment encompasses a
right to bear a firearm outside the home, this does not mean that
anytime an individual uses a firearm in public to harm or kill another
individual, they have acted in self-defense and should not be held
accountable for their actions. Whether an individual who uses a gun
against another person in public has a valid claim of self-defense is an
issue separate and apart from the question whether that individual has a
Second Amendment right to “bear” a loaded firearm in public.198
Eric Ruben has persuasively argued that the law of self-defense
can and should inform Second Amendment doctrine.199 The more
194

State-by-State Concealed Carry Permit Laws, BRITANNICA
PROCON.ORG, https://concealedguns.procon.org/state-by-state-concealed-carry-permit-laws/
(https://perma.cc/4Z6L-3QDP) (last visited Dec. 22, 2021). See also Guns in Public:
Concealed Carry, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policyareas/guns-in-public/concealed-carry/ (https://perma.cc/AEH4-K4VL) (last visited Dec. 22,
2021).
195 Guns in Public: Open Carry, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/open-carry/ (https://perma.cc/PY5Y-JCPU) (last visited
Dec. 22, 2021). See also Open Carry: Map, States & Everything You Need to Know Open
Carrying, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR FIREARMS ADVOCACY, https://gunlawsuits.org/gunlaws/open-carry/ (https://perma.cc/5GEL-MFQT) (last visited Dec. 22, 2021).
196 Jennifer Mascia, The Supreme Court’s Next Big Gun Case, Explained, TRACE (May 18,
2021), https://www.thetrace.org/2021/05/supreme-court-gun-rights-concealed-carry-newyork-corlett/ (https://perma.cc/7RM5-EDSG).
197 Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Majority of Supreme Court Appears To Think N.Y.
Gun Law Is Too Restrictive, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gun-rights-case-supremecourt/2021/11/03/6b9a75d8-3c13-11ec-a493-51b0252dea0c_story.html
(https://perma.cc/N86F-PL6E) (“A majority of Supreme Court Justices indicated
Wednesday that they believe Americans generally have a right to carry a handgun outside
the home for self-defense and that a New York law requiring special need for such a permit
is too restrictive”); Ian Millhiser, The NRA Had a Very Good Day in The Supreme Court,
VOX (May 18, 2021), https://www.vox.com/2021/11/3/22761240/supreme-court-secondamendment-rifle-bruen-heller-amy-coney-barrett (https://perma.cc/HH8V-6XUU) (noting
that at least 5 Justices appear likely to vote to strike down New York’s restriction on the
carrying of guns in public to those who can show “proper cause”).
198 Blocher, Pointing Guns, supra note 41, at 122 (“historical legal commentary and custom
indicate that the question of whether a particular actual use of a gun constitutes self-defense
is a question left to criminal and tort law, about which the Second Amendment is silent”) ,
citing Calderone v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2019),
aff’d 979 F.3d 1156 (7th Cir. 2020).
199 Ruben, supra note 60 (arguing that “the limitations of lawful self-defense can inform
Second Amendment doctrine by lending principled requirements and procedures for the
right to keep and bear arms”).
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individuals carry firearms in public, the greater the risk such firearms
may be used when individuals in public get into disputes, increasing the
likelihood that someone will end up dead or seriously wounded. As
Joseph Blocher has observed, a gun owner is more likely to pull a
weapon if he thinks the person he is facing is also armed.200 Indeed,
“the mere presence of a firearm can prime people to behave more
aggressively—a phenomenon known as the ‘weapons effect.’ ”201 This
is a sobering thought in light of the more than 300 million guns in the
hands of private Americans today.202
Compounding the prevalence of guns and the relaxing of
restrictions on the carrying of guns in public is the fact that racial
bias—both implicit and explicit—often influences which persons tend
to be seen as threats.203 Decades of social science research has
demonstrated that Black individuals are stereotyped as violent and
criminal.204 Indeed, the mere presence of a Black person can trigger
thoughts of violence and crime.205
We have all seen how racial stereotyping can lead to violence. In
2020, when Gregory McMichael saw a Black man, Ahmaud Arbery,
jogging past his home in Georgia, he immediately assumed Arbery had
just burglarized a vacant home under renovation down the street and
was fleeing the scene of the crime.206 It appears that McMichael
associated Arbery not only with crime but also with potential violence
as he immediately grabbed his gun and shouted for his son, Travis, to
grab his shotgun before the two of them proceeded to chase Arbery in
their pickup truck.207 The situation ended tragically when Travis
McMichael shot and killed Arbery at close range. Travis claimed he
shot Arbery in self-defense, after Arbery grabbed his shotgun and he
thought Arbery was going to shoot him with it.208
Throughout their state trial, the McMichaels, through their
attorneys, denied that race had anything to do with their actions.209 Yet
200

Blocher, Pointing Guns, supra note 41, at 108.
Id. at 109.
202 Id. at 108 n. 40.
203 Rolnick, supra note 39; Mario L. Barnes, Taking a Stand?: An Initial Assessment of the
Social and Racial Effects of Recent Innovations in Self-Defense Laws, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
3179 (2015).
204 Eberhardt, supra note 33.
205 Id.
206 Devon M. Sayers & Pamela Kirkland, Detective Testifies That Gregory Mcmichael Told
Him He Did Not See Ahmaud Arbery Commit A Crime, CNN (Nov. 9, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/09/us/ahmaud-arbery-killing-trial-day-3/index.html
(https://perma.cc/Q65X-T6XE).
207 Id.
208 Bill Chappell et al, Travis Mcmichael Says In His Murder Trial That He Felt Threatened
By Ahmaud Arbery, NPR (Nov. 17, 2021), https://www.michiganradio.org/2021-1117/travis-mcmichael-says-in-his-murder-trial-that-he-felt-threatened-by-ahmaud-arbery
(https://perma.cc/Z2S2-SM7H).
209 Assoc. Press, Attorneys For Men Charged In Ahmaud Arbery Killing Deny Racial
Motive, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/12/ahmaud-arbery-attorneys-mencharged-killing-deny-racism/5779662002/ (https://perma.cc/4JCB-72BZ).
201
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approximately two months after they were convicted of murder in state
court, the McMichaels were ready to admit that they targeted Arbery
because of his race in a plea agreement with federal prosecutors that
would have allowed them to serve the first 30 years of their state
sentences in federal prison rather than state prison.210 That plea
agreement was rejected by the judge after Arbery’s family objected
strenuously to its terms.211 The federal hate crimes case proceeded to
trial and the McMichaels and their co-defendant, William “Roddie”
Bryan, were found guilty of attempted kidnapping and using force and
threats of force to intimidate and interfere with Arbery’s right to use a
public street because of his race.212
To reduce the risk of gun violence, I offer two proposals that
would reform the law on initial aggressors. Law reform, however, can
only go so far to change what is really a deeply rooted cultural
phenomenon. Recognizing the limits of law reform, my ultimate hope
is that the legal reforms I propose can help gradually change cultural
attitudes about guns. If we want to make even a dent in the problem of
gun violence, we need to change America’s current love of guns by
changing the social norms surrounding gun possession and gun use.
This is what gun owners and organizations have been doing over the
years—just in the opposite direction. As Blocher notes, gun owners
have been steadily shifting the social norms surrounding gun possession
and gun use, making it not just normal but also desirable to possess
firearms and carry them in public.213
As outlined in greater detail below, I first propose that
individuals who claim self-defense after being charged with a crime
should be considered initial aggressors as a prima facie matter if their
words or acts created a reasonable apprehension of imminent death or
serious physical harm. Unlike many self-defense statutes that use the
language of provocation and require an intent to cause physical injury
or death before one loses the right to claim self-defense, the proposed
definition of the term “initial aggressor” does not require proof that the
defendant had an intent to harm the victim for initial aggressor status.
It shifts the focus away from the subjective mental state of the
defendant and instead utilizes an objective inquiry that applies from the
perspective of someone in the victim’s shoes. The jury may decide that
the defendant was not the initial aggressor if the defendant displayed or
210

Annabelle Timsit & Hannah Knowles, Judge Rejects Plea Deal For Travis Mcmichael
And His Father On Federal Hate-Crime Charges In Ahmaud Arbery’s Murder, WASH. POST
(Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/01/31/ahmaud-arbery-hatecrime-plea-deal/ (https://perma.cc/EJ2Y-JS59).
211 Id.
212 David Nakamura & Margaret Coker, Greg and Travis Mcmichael, William Bryan Guilty
of Hate Crimes in Ahmaud Arbery Killing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/22/arbery-verdict-hate-crimes/
(https://perma.cc/NSH4-LZ8G).
213 Blocher, Pointing Guns, supra note 41, at 105 (pointing out that some gun owners openly
carry to normalize the open carrying of guns and that “[t]his type of norm
entrepreuneuralism by gun owners can, and is designed to, shift social practices so as to
permanently shape the law and then cultural perceptions of gun use”).
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pointed their firearm in response to a credible and imminent threat of
death or serious physical injury with the intent of avoiding a physical
confrontation.214 Alternatively, the jury may find that the defendant was
the initial aggressor and reject the defendant’s claim of self-defense.
It is important to note that I am not proposing that States that
currently have only a provocation-with-intent type of aggressor
provision replace that provision with an aggressor provision. All I
suggest is that those States supplement their provocation provision
with an aggressor provision and define the term aggressor as proposed.
Second, I propose that an initial aggressor instruction be
mandated whenever an individual brings a firearm outside the home
and displays it in a threatening manner or points it at another person, is
subsequently charged with a crime arising from their use of the firearm,
and claims he was acting in self-defense. Both displaying a firearm in a
threatening manner and pointing a firearm at another person are
threatening acts that will generally create an apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm and therefore should be viewed as prima facie
evidence of aggression. If someone comes up to another person and
says, “Give me your wallet,” while opening up his jacket to reveal a
gun, it would be reasonable for the person being asked to give up his
wallet to fear death or serious bodily injury from the person displaying
his firearm.
Today, however, a judge might not give an initial aggressor
instruction if the judge is unaware that the initial aggressor limitation is
part of self-defense law and the prosecutor does not ask for such an
instruction. The initial aggressor limitation is not always taught in law
school classrooms and even when it is taught, it is often mentioned
only in passing so many judges and prosecutors may not be aware of it.
Moreover, even if a judge is aware of the initial aggressor limitation, the
judge may refuse to give an initial aggressor instruction if the incident
occurred in a state with a provoke with intent type of initial aggressor
rule and the judge thinks there is insufficient evidence that the
defendant’s intent in pointing or displaying a firearm was to make the
victim attack so the defendant could counterattack and then claim selfdefense. Even in states with an aggressor type of initial aggressor rule,
risk averse trial judges may refuse to give an initial aggressor instruction
out of concern that an appellate court will disagree with their decision
to give such an instruction and reverse that decision.
As discussed above, also problematic is the fact that judges may
wait until just before closing statements to decide whether to give an
initial aggressor instruction, making it difficult for the government to
present evidence to support their argument that the defendant was an
initial aggressor. Just before closing arguments, the government will
214

I offer this proposal in recognition of the fact that there will be instances when an
individual displays or points a firearm in self-defense and should not be considered the
initial aggressor in such situations. See infra text accompanying note 251 for an elaboration
on how one can avoid being considered the initial aggressor.
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have long finished presenting its case in chief. If it were clearer that an
initial aggressor instruction would be given in these types of cases, both
sides would be better able to plan which witnesses to present and how
to argue their respective cases.
The ultimate question of whether the defendant was the initial
aggressor and thus should lose the right to claim self-defense should be
left with the jury, not blocked by a trial court’s reluctance to give an
initial aggressor instruction. My second proposal thus mandates an
initial aggressor instruction whenever an individual points a firearm at
another person or displays a firearm in a threatening manner, is charged
with a crime arising from these actions, and claims he acted in selfdefense.
A.

Proposal 1: Clarifying the Definition of “Initial Aggressor”

As discussed above, most self-defense statutes do not define
the term “initial aggressor,” leaving it up to the courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether an individual defendant claiming selfdefense was the initial aggressor.215 Without any overarching guidance
on what it takes to be considered an initial aggressor, courts across the
nation apply different standards, resulting in similarly situated
individuals being treated differently. To help provide more clarity and
guidance to litigants, I propose a definition of “initial aggressor” that
legislatures could incorporate into their self-defense statutes.
Alternatively, courts could adopt the proposed definition when
deciding cases where the defendant’s status as an initial aggressor is an
issue.
Under the definition I propose, an “initial aggressor” would be
one whose words or acts created a reasonable apprehension of physical
harm in another person. One state already defines the term “initial
aggressor” in a similar fashion. In Connecticut, “[t]he initial aggressor is
the person who first acts in a manner that creates a reasonable belief in
another person’s mind that physical force is about to be used upon that
other person or persons.”216
Tennessee has adopted a somewhat similar definition, providing
that an aggressor is one “who produces fear or apprehension of death
or great bodily harm in the mind of his adversary.”217 Tennessee’s
definition, however, differs from the proposed definition in utilizing a
See, e.g., State v. Jones, 128 A.3d 431, 452 (Conn. 2015) (“Although the term ‘initial
aggressor’ is not defined by statute, in State v. Jimenez, we stated that ‘[i]t is not the law . . .
that the person who first uses physical force is necessarily the initial aggressor . . .’”).
216 State v. Ramos, 801 A.2d 788, 795 (Conn. 2002) (overturned on other grounds); State v.
Jones, 128 A.3d at 452 (noting that the initial aggressor is ‘the person who first acts in such
a manner that creates a reasonable belief in another person’s mind that physical force is
about to be used [on] that other person. . .’”); State v. Rivera, 204 A.3d 4, 26 (Conn. Ct.
App. 2019) (“The initial aggressor is the person who first acts in a manner that creates a
reasonable belief in another person’s mind that physical force is about to be used upon that
other person.”).
217 Gann v. State, 383 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tenn. 1964) (superseded on other grounds).
215
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subjective rather than an objective standard. Under Tennessee’s
definition, an individual qualifies as an initial aggressor if the
defendant’s acts produced a subjective fear or apprehension of death or
great bodily injury in the victim, even if those acts would not have had
the same effect on the average person in the victim’s shoes.
To understand the difference between Tennessee’s subjective
standard and the objective standard in the proposed definition, we need
only look back at the Chipotle parking lot incident. One might say that
Takelia Hill, the Black mother who got into a verbal confrontation with
Jillian Wuestenberg, leading Wuestenberg to grab a loaded gun and
point it at Hill for several minutes, did not seem afraid of Wuestenberg
during the entire encounter. Hill continued to argue with Wuestenberg
rather than back down even when Wuestenberg had her finger on the
trigger of her cocked and loaded gun and pointed that gun at Hill.
Under Tennessee’s definition of an aggressor, Wuestenberg might not
qualify as an initial aggressor if her act of pointing her gun at Hill did
not actually “produce fear or apprehension of death or great bodily
injury.” Under my proposed definition, however, Wuestenberg would
be considered the initial aggressor if the average person would have
feared physical harm from her actions. Even if Wuestenberg’s words or
acts did not create a subjective fear in Takelia Hill, those words and acts
would likely have created a reasonable apprehension of physical harm
in the average person and therefore Wuestenberg would fit within the
proposed definition of an initial aggressor.
Unlike provocation provisions that require the defendant to
have acted with the intent of causing physical injury or death, the
proposed definition does not require proof that the defendant
provoked the conflict with a pre-existing intent to harm the victim.
Proving that the defendant did what he did with an intent to harm the
victim is virtually impossible in cases where the defendant is the only
one alive—which will always be the case where the defendant is
charged with a homicide—and testifies that he did not have the intent
to do whatever the government is trying to prove he had the intent to
do. The proposed definition shifts the focus away from the mental state
of the defendant and instead asks whether the defendant’s words or
acts created a reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily harm.
In not requiring proof of a mental state for initial aggressor
status, the proposed definition is in line with the way the term
“aggressor” is currently understood in jurisdictions that utilize
aggressor language as opposed to provocation language to describe
their initial aggressor rules.218 The proposed definition, however, differs
from current definitions that require an initial aggressor to have
engaged in an unlawful act. For example, the D.C. Circuit’s definition
of initial aggressor requires “an affirmative unlawful act reasonably
calculated to produce an affray foreboding injurious or fatal

218

See supra Part I.A.2. and Part I.B.
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consequences.”219 The proposed definition does not require “an
affirmative unlawful act” before one can qualify as an initial aggressor.
Another way the proposed definition differs from other
definitions of “aggressor” is that it allows initial aggressor status to be
based on words or acts. Many states that embrace the second category
of initial aggressor do not allow mere words to serve as the basis for
initial aggressor status.220 By asking whether the defendant’s words or
acts created a reasonable apprehension of physical harm, the proposed
definition allows a jury to consider whether a defendant’s words
accompanying the display of a gun should qualify the defendant as an
initial aggressor. A defendant with a visibly holstered gun who says to
another person, “give me your wallet,” should be considered an initial
aggressor.
While the proposed definition may be somewhat novel in the
initial aggressor context, similar wording has been used to explain when
a person is justified in acting in self-defense. For example, courts in the
state of Washington have explained that “[o]ne of the elements of selfdefense is the person relying on the self-defense claim must have had
a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.”221 Similarly, in Indiana, “Selfdefense requires reasonable apprehension of harm by the defendant.”222
Similar language can be found in judicial opinions in other states.223
One also finds similar language in the definition of the crime of
assault. In Arizona, for example, one commits the crime of assault by
“[i]ntentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent physical injury.”224 In Georgia, one commits the crime of assault
if one “commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of
immediately receiving a violent injury”225 and one commits the crime of
aggravated assault if one assaults another person or places that person
in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury
with a deadly weapon.226
A similar standard applies in rape cases when the prosecution
does not have proof that the defendant used actual force to effectuate
the sexual intercourse and is trying to prove the defendant threatened
the victim with force to meet the force or threat of force element of

219

United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See text accompanying note 75.
221 State v. Walker, 966 P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. 1998) (emphasis added). See also State v.
Read, 53 P.3d 26, 29 (Wash. 2002) (“[t]o raise a self-defense claim in a murder prosecution,
a defendant must produce some evidence to establish the killing occurred in circumstances
amounting to defense of life and he or she had a reasonable apprehension of great bodily
harm and imminent danger”) (emphasis added).
222
Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis added).
223 State v. Crutcher, 1 N.W.2d 195, 198 (Iowa 1941) (“An actual assault is not always
necessary in order to justify a person in using a deadly weapon in self-defense if the
circumstances are such as to cause a reasonable apprehension that an assault is about to be
committed”) (emphasis added).
224 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(2) (emphasis added).
225 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-20(a)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
226 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(a)(2).
220
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rape.227 For example, in Hazel v. State, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, the highest court in Maryland, explained the proof required
for rape in a case involving threats of force as follows:
If the acts and threats of the defendant were reasonably
calculated to create in the mind of the victim -- having regard to
the circumstances in which she was placed -- a real apprehension,
due to fear, of imminent bodily harm, serious enough to impair or
overcome her will to resist, then such acts and threats are the
equivalent of force.228
Similarly, in State v. Dill, a Delaware court explained:
If the acts and conduct of the person charged with the crime
are sufficient reasonably to create in the mind of the woman, having
regard for the circumstances in which she is placed, a real
apprehension of dangerous consequences, or great bodily harm, so that her
will is, in fact, overcome, such acts and conduct are equivalent
to force actually exerted for the same purpose.229
It is also common to find such language in statutes explaining
what is needed for a protective order based on domestic violence or
stalking. In West Virginia, for example, one seeking a protective order
based on domestic violence or abuse can prove such violence or abuse
by acts by a family or household member “[p]lacing another in
reasonable apprehension of physical harm.”230 Similarly, in Oregon, a
court may issue a stalking protective order if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence “[t]he repeated and unwanted contact
causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety
of the victim or a member of the victim's immediate family or
household.”231
The proposed definition merely establishes initial aggressor
status as a prima facie matter. The jury may decide that the defendant
was not the initial aggressor if the defendant displayed or pointed their
firearm in response to a credible and imminent threat of death or
serious physical injury with the intent of avoiding a physical
confrontation.
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Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d 922, 925 (Md. Ct. App. 1960); State v. Dill, 40 A.2d 443, 444
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1944).
228 Hazel v. State, 157 A.2d at 925.
229 State v. Dill, 40 A.2d at 444.
230 J.C. v. J.M., No. 19-1168, 2021 W. Va. LEXIS 263, at *16-17 (May 20, 2021).
231 Schiffner v. Banks, 33 P.3d 701, 704 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
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Proposal 2: Judges Must Give an Initial Aggressor
Instruction Whenever a Defendant Claiming SelfDefense Brought a Firearm Outside the Home and
Displayed It in a Threatening Manner or Pointed It at
Another Person

My second proposal is to require judges to give an initial
aggressor instruction whenever an individual brings a firearm outside
the home and displays it in a threatening manner or points it at another
person, is charged with a crime, and claims self-defense. Displaying a
firearm in a threatening manner and pointing a firearm at another
person are threatening acts that would ordinarily create an
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury in another person, and
thus each should be viewed as prima facie evidence of aggression.232
The ultimate question of whether the defendant was the initial
aggressor is supposed to be a question for the jury to decide.233 Too
often, however, the jury never gets to decide this question because the
judge declines to give an initial aggressor instruction. In cases involving
the use of a firearm, judges who favor gun rights may refuse to give an
initial aggressor instruction because they won’t see that pointing a gun
at another person is a threatening act that would cause most people to
fear death or serious bodily harm. Even judges who are not Second
Amendment enthusiasts may refuse to give an initial aggressor
instruction out of fear of being reversed on appeal.
To ensure that the jury will be allowed to decide this question,
this proposal lowers the threshold for the giving of an initial aggressor
instruction when the defendant brought a firearm outside the home and
displayed it in a threatening manner or pointed it at another person.234
Judges should be required to give an initial aggressor instruction
whenever a defendant claiming self-defense brought a firearm outside
the home and either displayed that firearm in a threatening manner or
pointed it at another person.
Of course, not all individuals who bring a firearm outside the
home and display or point that firearm are initial aggressors.235 There
232

My second proposal is limited to firearms and does not apply to other weapons. It would
be difficult to administer a rule that applied to all weapons because so many items—even
things that are ordinarily considered harmless objects—can be turned into weapons. One
need only talk to a prison official to learn about the many ordinary items, including
toothbrushes, newspapers and magazines, that have been turned into deadly weapons. See
J.M. Lincoln, et al., Inmate‐made weapons in prison facilities: assessing the injury risk,
12 INJURY PREVENTION 195 (2006) (noting “[i]tems that appear innocuous have been
converted into weapons that maimed and killed correction officers,” including
“toothbrushes, disposable razors, metal from ventilators, batteries, and even paper hardened
with toothpaste and sharpened”).
233 See supra text accompanying note 123.
234 Other scholars have suggested other ways to hold accountable gun owners who carry a
firearm in public and then use it to kill another person. See, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, When
Provocation is No Excuse: Making Gun Owners Bear the Risks of Carrying in Public, 69
Buff. L. Rev. 943 (2021).
235 Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of
Criminal Violence, and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029 (1998) (arguing
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are times when an individual may be threatened by another individual
or group of individuals and need to display or point a firearm at those
individuals to deter them from attacking.236
For example, a gay man or transgender woman living in or
visiting a neighborhood where other gay men or trans women have
been harassed, beaten, or killed by homophobic or transphobic
individuals might carry a firearm for protection.237 In an effort to avoid
physical harm, he or she might display or point that firearm if followed
or approached by individuals who indicate by their words or acts that
they plan to do harm. If one is a member of a racial, ethnic, or religious
community that has been repeatedly targeted for harassment and
violence, one might carry a firearm for protection and display or point
that firearm if followed or approached by individuals who suggest
through their words or acts that they pose a threat of physical harm.238
And one does not have to be a member of a subordinated group in
society to believe that carrying a firearm is necessary to protect oneself.
Anyone living, working, or traversing in an area racked with violent
crime may feel the need to carry a firearm for self-protection, 239
although having a firearm often does not always provide the protection
that people think it will provide.240 The fact that one was carrying a
against attempts to strengthen self-defense doctrine on the ground that this will work to the
disadvantage of law-abiding citizens who wish to use firearms to protect themselves).
236 Some states explicitly acknowledge that one who displays a firearm with the intent to
warn away another person who is threatening serious bodily injury or death has not
committed a criminal act. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (II-a) (2014).
237 Amicus Brief by the DC Project Foundation, Operation Blazing Sword—Pink Pistols,
and Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership in Support of the Petitioner in New
York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen (discussing violence against members of the
LGBT community creating need to carry guns outside the home for self-protection).
238 Amicus Brief by Black Attorneys of Legal Aid, The Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn
Defender Services et al., in Support of Petitioners, New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc.,
Inc. v. Bruen. See also Nicholas J. Johnson, Firearms Policy and the Black Community: An
Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1491 (2013) (documenting long
tradition of firearms ownership and armed self-defense in the Black community); SpearIt,
Firepower to the People: Gun Rights & The Law of Self-Defense to Curb Police
Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 189, 232 (2017) (arguing that Black civilians should arm
themselves to protect against police brutality).
239 Cottrol, supra note 235, at 1074.
240 For example, many female gun owners believe that having a gun makes them safer, when
owning a gun actually puts them at greater risk of dying or being seriously injured. Devin
Hughes & Evan DeFilippis, Gun-Rights Advocates Claim Owning a Gun Makes a Woman
Safer. The Research Says They’re Wrong., TRACE (May 2,
2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/05/gun-ownership-makes-women-saferdebunked/ (https://perma.cc/D7A9-W28A) (finding that “owning a gun, rather than making
women safer, actually puts them at significantly greater risk of violent injury and death”).
Contrary to the common belief that a gun in the home increases one’s safety and security, a
gun in the home is much more likely to be used against the gun owner or a family member
than for self-protection. Arlette Saenz, Which D.C. Neighborhoods are Packing the Most
Heat?, ABC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dc-neighborhoodspacking-heat/story?id=12870238 (https://perma.cc/Z9Y9-66EJ) (“studies have found that a
gun in the home is 22 times more likely to be used against the owner or a family member
than it is to be used for protection”); Arthur L. Kellerman, et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to
Firearms in The Home, 45 J. OF TRAUMA: INJURY, INFECTION AND CRITICAL CARE 263, 263
(1998) (“Guns kept in homes are more likely to be involved in a fatal or nonfatal accidental
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firearm in public in anticipation of the need for self-protection does not
mean one will lose the right to claim self-defense if one ends up
needing to display, point, or discharge that firearm to ward off the
threat under my proposal.241 Indeed, if one was obviously acting in selfdefense, most likely one will not even be charged with a crime. My
proposal is only triggered if an individual is charged criminally and
claims they acted in self-defense. Additionally, the mere fact that the
judge must give the jury an initial aggressor instruction does not mean
that the jury will view one as the initial aggressor and reject one’s claim
of self-defense. The jury in Kyle Rittenhouse’s case, for example, was
given an initial aggressor instruction and found Rittenhouse not guilty
on all counts.
Unfortunately, it is still true today that certain individuals are
more likely to be seen as aggressors than others. As discussed above,
racial stereotypes about Black and brown individuals play a huge role in
the perception of threat.242 Such stereotypes have long played a role in
self-defense cases with White individuals being able to successfully
claim they acted reasonably in self-defense when they shot a Black or
brown individual when their claim of self-defense would not likely have
succeeded had the tables been turned and a Black or brown individual
had done the same thing.243 If George Zimmerman had been a Black
man and if Trayvon Martin had been White, it is unlikely that
Zimmerman would have been released rather than arrested after
shooting and killing Martin.244 Similarly, if Kyle Rittenhouse had been a
Black man, it is unlikely that he would have been allowed to walk past
law enforcement with his AR-15 style rifle hanging across his chest
after shooting and killing two people and seriously injuring another
amidst individuals yelling at the police, “Hey, the dude right here just
shot all of dem down there. That dude just shot them,” without being
stopped and at least questioned, if not taken into custody.245 It is also
unlikely that he would have been found not guilty on all charges.

shooting, criminal assault, or suicide attempt than to be used to injure or kill in selfdefense.”).
241 Under my proposal, the jury can find that the defendant was not the initial aggressor if
the defendant displayed the firearm in response to a credible threat of physical harm, and his
or her intent in displaying the firearm was to avoid a physical confrontation. See supra text
accompanying note 251.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
243 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996).
244 Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 151, at 1566 (“When there is a dead victim and
police know who killed the victim, they usually arrest the obvious perpetrator of the
homicide and then investigate”).
245 Robert Burns, Every Video of Kyle Rittenhouse (Kenosha Shooting) Including First
Shooting (Aug. 26, 2020) (6:20 - 6:39 minutes), https://thespacecoastrocket.com/everyvideo-of-kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shooting/, also available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ro8hkfBDVw (perma.cc/7WEE-4J3F).
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In our society, even today, Black men—particularly, Black men
with guns—are just more likely to be perceived as aggressors than
similarly situated White individuals.246 As David Frum observes:
. . . the right to carry arms is America’s most unequally upheld
right. Ohio is an open-carry state. Yet Tamir Rice, a black 12-yearold, was shot dead in Cleveland within seconds of being observed
carrying what proved to be a pellet gun. John Crawford was shot
dead for moving around an Ohio Walmart with an air rifle he had
picked up from a display shelf. Minnesota allows concealed-carry
permit-holders to open carry if they wish—yet Minnesotan
Philando Castile was killed after merely telling a police officer he
had a legal gun in his car.247

The tendency to associate Black persons with violence is a
serious problem that cannot be fixed overnight.248 The solution,
however, is not to encourage more Black people to arm themselves nor
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Eberhardt, supra note 33. See also CAROL ANDERSON, THE SECOND: RACE AND GUNS IN A
FATALLY UNEQUAL AMERICA 7 (Bloomsbury Publishing 2021) (arguing that the Second
Amendment “was designed and has consistently been constructed to keep AfricanAmericans powerless and vulnerable”). Explaining the title of her book, Anderson writes,
“From colonial times through the twenty-first century, regardless of the laws, regardless of
the court decisions, regardless of the changing political environment, the Second has
consistently meant this: The second a Black person exercises that right, the second they pick
up a gun to protect themselves (or not), their life—as surely as Philando Castile’s, as surely
as Alton Sterling’s, as surely as twelve-year-old Tamir Rice’s—could be snatched away in
that same fatal second.” Id. at 8. For commentary on Anderson’s book, see Dave Davies,
Historian Uncovers the Racist Roots of The 2nd Amendment, NPR (June 2, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/2021/06/02/1002107670/historian-uncovers-the-racist-roots-of-the2nd-amendment (https://perma.cc/HAT3-5A2Z). Cf. Jonathan Turley, Second Amendment
Latest Issue To Be Reframed — Wrongly — As 'Racist', Hill (July 28, 2021),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/565177-second-amendment-latest-issue-to-bereframed-wrongly-as-racist (https://perma.cc/W24J-SRTN) (opining “the suggestion that
[racism] was a primary motivation for the Second Amendment is utter nonsense”).
247 David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-meancharlottesville-could-have-been-graver/537087/ (https://perma.cc/4SZ6-FNUT), citing
David A. Graham, Do African Americans Have a Right to Bear Arms?, ATLANTIC (June 21,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-continued-erosion-of-theafrican-american-right-to-bear-arms/531093/ (https://perma.cc/MX6C-26LZ). See also
Avinash Amarth, Michael Thomas, & Christopher Smith, Second Class, INQUEST (Nov. 5,
2021), https://inquest.org/nyc-public-defenders-amicus-second-class/ (arguing that Black
and brown individuals are treated like second-class citizens when it comes to the Second
Amendment (https://perma.cc/LD3Y-RCDR); Sharone Mitchell, Jr., There’s No Second
Amendment on the South Side of Chicago: Why Public Defenders Are Standing With The
New York State Rifle And Pistol Association In The Supreme Court, NATION (Nov. 12,
2021), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/gun-control-supreme-court/
(https://perma.cc/2BFV-XEJY).
248 While I have engaged in research on implicit racial bias and how we can start trying to
overcome implicit bias elsewhere, see, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Awareness as a First Step Toward
Overcoming Implicit Bias in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS (Redfield ed. 2017), Lee,
Making Race Salient, supra note 151, figuring out how to get to a world in which racial bias
does not influence the way people perceive Black and brown individuals with firearms is
beyond the scope of this Article.
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to relax laws intended to curb gun violence.249 Even when Black
individuals are lawfully carrying guns, they are usually seen as the
aggressors.250
In recognition of the fact that an individual with a firearm may
have displayed or pointed that firearm to try to avoid becoming the
victim of physical violence, I also propose that the jury can find that the
defendant was not the initial aggressor if: (1) the defendant displayed
the firearm in response to a credible threat of physical harm, and (2) his
or her intent in displaying the firearm was to avoid a physical
confrontation.251 If the jury finds the defendant was not the initial
aggressor, it can go on to consider the defendant’s claim of selfdefense. If the jury finds that the defendant was the initial aggressor,
then it would decide the case without considering the defendant’s claim
of self-defense. And remember that if one’s use of a firearm aimed at
another person or displayed in a threatening manner was obviously an
act of self-defense, the prosecutor will likely choose not to press any
criminal charges.252 My jury instruction proposal only comes into play if
an individual who points a firearm at another person or displays a
firearm in a threatening manner is charged with a crime and claims they
acted in self-defense. If one is not charged in the first instance, a jury
instruction would not be necessary.
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Elie Mystal, Why are Public Defenders Backing a Major Assault on Gun Control?, THE
NATION (July 26, 2021) (critiquing public defender offices supporting petitioners in New
York State Pistol and Rifle Association v. Bruen),
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/black-gun-owners-court/ (https://perma.cc/UQ5LTYLM). See Brief of the Black Attorneys of Legal Aid, the Bronx Defenders, Brooklyn
Defender Services, et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners in New York State Rifle
& Pistol Assoc. v. Corlett, Case. No. 20-843, at 5 (arguing that New York’s licensing
scheme “criminalize[s] gun ownership by racial and ethnic minorities”).
250 David A. Graham, Do African Americans Have a Right to Bear Arms?, ATLANTIC (June
21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/the-continued-erosion-ofthe-african-american-right-to-bear-arms/531093/ (https://perma.cc/MX6C-26LZ). Graham
points out that field work by Jennifer Carlson, a sociologist at the University of Arizona,
confirms “that law-abiding men of color are . .. more likely to be harassed simply for
choosing to carry a gun.” Id., quoting JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE
EVERYDAY POLITICS OF GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE 115 (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). “They
must navigate the widespread presumptions that they are criminals and that their guns are
illegally possessed or carried.” Id.
251 I would support placing the burden of disproving initial aggressor status on the defendant
since the defendant is the one claiming to have acted in self-defense, but the decision as to
whether to place the burden of proving or disproving initial aggressor status on the
prosecution or the defense would be up to each jurisdiction.
252
Moreover, if the person claiming self-defense is in a state with an immunity provision,
she will have a pretrial opportunity to present a prima facie case that she was acting in selfdefense and if the government cannot overcome that showing by clear and convincing
evidence, the person claiming self-defense will be completely immune from criminal
prosecution. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (1) & (4) (2010) (“In a criminal prosecution,
once a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution has been
raised by the defendant at a pretrial immunity hearing, the burden of proof by clear and
convincing evidence is on the party seeking to overcome the immunity from criminal
prosecution provided in subsection (1)”). For critique of these immunity provisions, see Eric
Ruben, Self-Defense Exceptionalism and the Immunization of Private Violence, ___ S. CAL.
L. REV. ___ (forthcoming).
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One might object to the proposal on the ground that it
improperly assumes that the display of a firearm in a threatening
manner or the pointing of a firearm at another person gives rise to a
reasonable apprehension of physical harm. There is nothing improper
about singling out the display of a firearm in a threatening manner or
the pointing of a firearm at another person for an initial aggressor jury
instruction. Indeed, in recognition of how dangerous the act of
pointing a firearm at another person can be, some states direct the jury
to presume recklessness and danger from the act of pointing a
firearm—even if unloaded—at another person. In the gun-friendly
state of Texas, for example, the deadly conduct statute provides, “A
person commits [this] offense if he recklessly engages in conduct that
places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.”253 The
statute goes on to provide that “[r]ecklessness and danger are presumed
if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of
another whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.”254
Moreover, the act of displaying a firearm in a threatening manner is a
crime in nearly all states.255
Former National Rifle Association (NRA) CEO Wayne
LaPierre’s 2012 statement, “The only thing that stops a bad guy with a
gun is a good guy with a gun,” has become a rallying cry for gun
enthusiasts.256 The problem with this slogan is that it isn’t necessarily
true. Too often people can’t tell whether a person with a gun is a “good
guy with a gun” or a bad guy with a gun. As Mary Anne Franks
observes, when Wayne LaPierre and his wife got “swatted” in 2013,257
253

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(a) (West 2021).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(c) (West 2021). Texas also provides that whenever a
jury instruction with a presumption is given to the jury, it must be accompanied by an
additional jury instruction that tells the jury, inter alia, that “the presumption applies unless
the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts giving rise to the presumption do
not exist.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.05(2).
255 Nearly every state prohibits displaying a gun in an “angry” or “threatening” manner.
Chip Brownlee, What Counts as Brandishing? When Is It Illegal?, TRACE (July 2,
2020), https://www.thetrace.org/2020/07/armed-st-louis-missouri-couple-threatbrandishing-self-defense/ (https://perma.cc/7GUG-2Q5B) (last visited April 2, 2022).
Interestingly, according to the U.S. Concealed Carry Association, only five states
(Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia) explicitly prohibit
“brandishing,” but “[b]randishing a firearm may fall under other state laws, such as
aggravated assault, assault with a deadly weapon, improper use of a firearm, menacing,
intimidating or disorderly conduct.” Brandishing, U.S. CONCEALED CARRY
ASS’N, https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/resources/terminology/generalterms/brandishing/ (https://perma.cc/LM76-LTSN) (last visited April 2, 2022).
256
Mark Memmott, Only 'A Good Guy With A Gun' Can Stop School Shootings, NRA Says,
NPR (Dec. 21. 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2012/12/21/167785169/live-blog-nra-news-conference (https://perma.cc/XAX6-57CB).
See also Susanna Lee, How The ‘Good Guy With A Gun’ Became A Deadly American
Fantasy, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 8, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-thegood-guy-with-a-gun-became-a-deadly-american-fantasy (https://perma.cc/GQ36-9269)
(last visited April 2, 2022).
257 Dakin Andone, Swatting Is a Dangerous Prank with Potentially Deadly Consequences.
Here’s What You Need To Know, CNN (March 30, 2019) (explaining that “swatting is a
prank call made to authorities with the express purpose of luring them to a location – usually
a home – where they are led to believe a horrific crime has been committed or is in
254
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even they couldn’t tell whether the police surrounding their house were
good guys with guns or bad guys with guns.258 And when the good guy
with the gun is Black, law enforcement officers—who have a lot more
training than civilians and presumably should be better at distinguishing
good guys with guns from bad guys with guns—often assume that the
Black guy with a gun is a bad guy and end up shooting him.259
Nor would it be wise to carve out an exception to existing or
proposed initial aggressor rules for racial minorities or anyone else as
this would invite criticism for not carving out exceptions for others.
Moreover, carving out exceptions for certain people would likely lead
to other carve-outs, with many individuals claiming to fit within the
exception. Eventually, the exception or exceptions would end up
swallowing the rule.
In cases where an individual displays a firearm in a threatening
manner or points it at another person in public and is charged with a
crime, the proposal does not require the jury to find that the defendant
was the initial aggressor; it simply ensures that the jury gets to
determine whether the defendant was the initial aggressor. In this way,
it attempts to even the playing field so that all individuals with firearms
progress” which usually “results in a forceful response from local police or SWAT teams,
who have no way [of knowing] the call is a hoax”),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/30/us/swatting-what-is-explained/index.html
(https://perma.cc/8MPJ-6YWJ).
258 Franks recounts what happened to Wayne LaPierre and his wife Susan in 2013:
Around 4 a.m. on April 4, 2013, the LaPierres were “swatted.” A 911 operator
called Susan LaPierre to tell her that police had surrounded their house. They were
responding to a call from a person claiming to be Wayne LaPierre, who stated that
he had just shot his wife, had barricaded himself inside their home and would
come out shooting if police tried to take him. Eventually the operator persuaded
Wayne and Susan to emerge from their house, where they were met by a dozen
police officers yelling at them to get down. But for some length of time, Susan
refused to go outside because she didn’t believe that the caller was a real 911
operator. “‘Don’t go outside,’ she told Wayne. ‘You don’t know who that is.
They’re going to kill you.’” That night in their expensive, well-secured home, the
multimillionaire vice president of the NRA and his wife could not tell if the guys
with guns surrounding their house were good or not. Had the couple armed
themselves as they emerged, the police would not have been able to tell if they
were good guys, either.
Mary Anne Franks, For The NRA’s Leaders, Lives Of Privilege And Private Security,
WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/for-the-nrasleaders-lives-of-privilege-and-private-security/2021/12/22/1f7b4b22-496b-11ec-b8d9232f4afe4d9b_story.html (https://perma.cc/JQC7-XSFD) (last visited April 2, 2022).
259 Police shootings of Black men using their firearms to hold criminal suspects until the
police arrive suggest “one of the biggest limits of the conservative argument that ‘good guys
with guns’ are what’s needed to prevent gun violence: The police can’t always tell a good
guy with a gun from a bad guy with a gun, and when the good guy with a gun is black, the
police sometimes assume he’s a bad guy.” Cynthia Lee, It Looks Like Another Black Man
With a Gun Was Killed by Police After Trying to Help, SLATE (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/ej-bradford-jemel-roberson-police-shootingsgood-guy-with-gun.html (https://perma.cc/DN4C-X4YD) (last visited April 2, 2022);
Cynthia Lee, Jemel Roberson's Avoidable Death: Reform Deadly Force Laws, Require
Police To De-Escalate, USA TODAY (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/15/jemel-roberson-killed-deadly-forcerequire-police-de-escalation-column/2002341002/ (https://perma.cc/X99B-TWPA) (last
visited April 2, 2022).
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are treated the same way as Black and brown individuals with firearms
tend to be treated. If one brings a firearm out in public and ends up
using it to harm others or create reasonable apprehension of physical
harm, it seems eminently fair to increase the scrutiny on that
individual’s actions.
While it may seem out of the ordinary to mandate the giving of
a particular jury instruction, it is common to require certain jury
instructions in a criminal case. For example, judges are typically
required to give an instruction to the jury on the presumption of
innocence and the burden of proof.260 Another commonly required jury
instruction is the instruction that the defendant has a constitutional
right not to testify and if the defendant chooses to exercise this right,
the jury should not draw any unfavorable inference from the
defendant’s decision not to testify.261 When a defendant decides to
testify at trial and prior convictions are entered into evidence against
him, the judge is typically required to instruct the jury that they should
only consider those prior convictions as part of their assessment as to
whether the defendant is a credible witness, not as proof that the
defendant committed the charged offense.262 When the government is
trying multiple defendants together, the judge typically must give the
jury an instruction that the fact that the defendants are on trial together
is not evidence that they were associated with one another or that any
one of them is guilty.263
Judges are also required to give certain jury instructions
depending on the type of evidence that has been presented. For
example, in cases in which the government presents tracking dog
evidence, some states require the judge to issue a cautionary instruction
to the jury as follows: “You must consider tracking-dog evidence with
great care and remember that it has little value as proof.”264 Some
jurisdictions strongly recommend that the judge give an instruction
advising the jury that cross-racial identifications are less reliable than
same-race identifications in cases where a witness of one race identifies
a defendant of another race as the perpetrator of the crime.265
It is also common to require the judge to give certain jury
instructions when the defendant has proffered some evidence
supporting a criminal defense. For example, when a defendant presents
some evidence of self-defense, the judge is typically required to give a
jury instruction outlining the elements of self-defense.266 Typically, the
judge is required to instruct the jury on which party bears the burden of
proving or disproving self-defense and by what standard of evidence.267
260

6 WAYNE LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.8(a), § 24.8(c) (4th ed.) (2021).
M CRIM JI 3.3.
262 M CRIM JI 3.4.
263 M CRIM JI 2.19; CALCRIM No. 203.
264 M CRIM JI 4.14.
265 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,
557 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
266 M CRIM JI 7.20.
267 CALCRIM No. 505, quoting People v. Breverman 960 P.2d 1094 (Cal.4th 1998).
261
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Some jurisdictions that recognize the defense of imperfect self-defense
require the judge to give an instruction on imperfect self-defense
whenever the judge instructs the jury on self-defense.268 Similarly, in
cases where the defendant presents evidence of heat of passion, the
judge is typically required to give an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter.269
Requiring jury instructions in the situations described above
provides consistency and certainty, both of which are helpful to both
litigants and judges. Mandating an initial aggressor instruction in cases
involving a criminal defendant who displayed a firearm in a threatening
way or pointed it at another person offers a measure of certainty and
consistency that is currently lacking and would enable litigants to better
prepare their cases at trial. In the Kyle Rittenhouse case, for example,
the judge did not rule on whether to give a provocation instruction
until just before closing arguments.270 This hindered the prosecution’s
ability to lay the groundwork for the argument that Rittenhouse
provoked the danger he found himself in by bringing an AR-15 style
rifle to Kenosha, Wisconsin on the third night of racial protests—an
argument that the prosecution finally made during closing arguments.
By closing arguments, however, the jury had already heard all the
testimony and likely had formulated strong opinions about
Rittenhouse’s self-defense claim.

C.

Applying the Proposed Reforms

To see how the proposed reforms would work, let’s return to
our hypothetical McCloskeys. Under Missouri law, as in most states, a
person is justified in using physical force in self-defense if they
reasonably believe the use of force is necessary to protect against an
imminent threat.271 Missouri also recognizes the initial aggressor
limitation on the defense of self-defense.272
If our hypothetical McCloskeys had shot and killed a protestor
in a state with a provoke-with-intent type of initial aggressor rule, they
would not be precluded from arguing to a jury that they acted in selfdefense. This is because the McCloskeys could simply take the stand
and say it was not their intent to provoke any of the protestors to attack
them so they could then fire upon the protestors and claim selfdefense. Without an admission that it was their intent to provoke an
268

CALCRIM No. 604.
CALCRIM No. 570, quoting People v. Breverman 960 P.2d 1094 (Cal.4th 1998).
270 Kim Bellware, Jury in Rittenhouse Trial Can Consider Lesser Charges and Whether He
Provoked Attack, Judge Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/11/14/rittenhouse-jury-instructions/
(https://perma.cc/LCQ4-BRMN).
271 MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031(1) (2016) (“A person may . . . use physical force upon another
person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such force to be necessary to
defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the
use or imminent use of unlawful force by such other person”).
272 MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.1(1)(a) (West 2016).
269
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attack, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the government to
prove otherwise.
If our hypothetical McCloskeys had shot and killed a protestor
in a state that includes an aggressor type of initial aggressor rule,
whether they would be allowed to claim self-defense would depend in
large part on how that state defines the term “initial aggressor.” As
discussed above, some jurisdictions require proof that the defendant
was engaged in an unlawful act before the defendant can be considered
a provocateur or aggressor.273 A person who carries a gun in public and
points it at another person might not qualify as an initial aggressor in a
state that freely allows the open carry of firearms.
Under Missouri law, an individual has no right to use physical
force in self-defense if he was the initial aggressor unless he withdraws
from the encounter and effectively communicates his withdrawal to the
other person who nonetheless persists in attacking.274 Missouri courts
have defined an “initial aggressor” as “one who first attacks or
threatens to attack another.”275
If the McCloskeys had fired their weapons upon any of the
protestors who were simply walking past their house, there is no
question that they would qualify as initial aggressors under current
Missouri law since they would have been the first to attack. Let’s say,
however, that Mark McCloskey had first advanced towards one of the
protesters with his firearm pointed at the protester and got so close to
the protestor that the protestor tried to push the firearm away to disarm
the McCloskey. If our hypothetical Mark McCloskey had then shot and
killed the protestor, a prosecutor could argue that by advancing towards
the protestor with his firearm pointed at the protestor, hypothetical
McCloskey had threatened to attack the protestor and therefore was the
initial aggressor. Hypothetical McCloskey, however, might argue—just
as real Travis McMichael and real Kyle Rittenhouse argued—that he
feared the person he shot was attempting to get his firearm to use it
against him and shot him in self-defense. If the judge overseeing our
hypothetical case was not too sympathetic with Black Lives Matter
protestors,276 that judge might conclude that the act of pointing an AR273

U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.1(1)(a) (West 2016).
275 State v. Anthony, 319 S.W.3d 524, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (“an initial aggressor, that
is, one who first attacks or threatens to attack another, is not justified in using force to
protect himself from the counterattack that he provoked.”); State v. Morse, 498 S.W.3d 467,
472 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“An initial aggressor is one who first attacks or threatens to attack
another”), quoting State v. Hughes, 84 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Mo. App. 2002).
276 For example, Republican Senator Ron Johnson suggested that he wasn’t afraid of the
pro-Trump MAGA (Make America Great Again) individuals who violently stormed the
U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, in an effort to prevent Joe Biden but he would have been
afraid if the individuals had been Black Lives Matter or Antifa protestors. See Ben Leonard,
Ron Johnson Says He Didn't Feel Threatened Jan. 6. If BLM or Antifa Stormed Capitol, He
'Might Have,' POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/13/ronjohnson-black-lives-matter-antifa-capitol-riot-475727 (https://perma.cc/24M3-KE6S)
(reporting that Senator Ron Johnson (R- WI) told a conservative talk show radio host, “Even
though those thousands of people that were marching to the Capitol were trying to pressure
people like me to vote the way they wanted me to vote, I knew those were people that love
274
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15 style rifle at another person was not an act of aggression. If so, the
judge might decline to give the jury an initial aggressor instruction, and
the jury would not get to consider whether McCloskey was the initial
aggressor. Under my proposal, in contrast, the judge would have to give
the jury an initial aggressor instruction and let the jury decide whether
hypothetical McCloskey was the initial aggressor.
Recall that the actual McCloskeys also argued they were acting
in defense of their home. Like many states, 277 Missouri recognizes the
defense of habitation. 278 As a general matter, the defense of habitation
gives a resident of a dwelling the right to use deadly force to protect
against an imminent unlawful entry into the dwelling.279
Until 2007, Missouri’s defense of habitation required strict
proportionality.280 A Missouri homeowner (or resident of the dwelling)
could only use deadly force against an intruder if she reasonably
believed the intruder was threatening imminent death or serious bodily
injury.281 In 2007, the Missouri legislature combined the defenses of
self-defense and habitation.282 In rewriting the defense of habitation
statute, the legislature removed the proportionality requirement that
used to apply when one was defending one’s home.283 The statute now
appears to allow a lawful resident of a dwelling to use deadly force
against any person who unlawfully enters, or attempts to unlawfully
enter the dwelling, without a corresponding belief that the intruder
poses a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury.284 Unless the
Missouri courts interpret the law as requiring proportionality, a
Missouri homeowner who inadvertently leaves her front or back door
unlocked can shoot an unarmed individual as he is entering the home
through the unlocked door, even if she knows that the individual is her
drunk, unarmed next door neighbor mistakenly thinking he is entering
his own home.
Additionally, under longstanding pre-2010 Missouri case law,
the defense of habitation only applied to entries into the dwelling or the
home, not entries into places outside the home like the front porch or

this country, that truly respect law enforcement, would never do anything to break the law,
and so I wasn't concerned,” then adding, “Now, had the tables been turned — Joe, this could
get me in trouble — had the tables been turned, and President Trump won the election and
those were tens of thousands of Black Lives Matter and Antifa protesters, I might have been
a little concerned”); Allison Pecorin, GOP Sen. Ron Johnson Says He Didn't Feel
'Threatened' By Capitol Marchers But May Have if BLM or Antifa Were Involved,
ABCNEWS (Mar. 13, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/gop-sen-ron-johnson-feelthreatened-capitol-marchers/story?id=76437425 (https://perma.cc/6CFX-GH26).
277 Annotation, Homicide or Assault in Defense of Habitation or Property, 25 A.L.R. 508
(1923).
278 MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(2) (West 2016).
279 40 AM. JUR.2d Homicide §161.
280 Sarah A. Pohlman, Comment, Shooting from the Hip: Missouri’s New Approach to the
Defense of Habitation, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 861 (2012).
281 Id.
282 MO. REV. STAT. § 563.031.2(2) (West 2021). See also Pohlman, supra note 281, at 875.
283 Pohlman, supra note 281, at 876.
284 Id.
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the front yard.285 In 2010, the Missouri legislature expanded the defense
of habitation to apply to any private property.286 As a result, Missouri’s
defense of habitation statute now appears to allow a lawful resident of a
dwelling to use deadly force against one who unlawfully enters the
curtilage, i.e., the area immediately surrounding the home, even if the
person does not pose any threat of physical harm to the resident of the
dwelling or others.287
Given these changes to the defense of habitation in Missouri, if
the McCloskeys had shot and killed a protestor and could show that
they did so because that protestor unlawfully, i.e., without their
permission, had put one foot onto their front lawn, i.e., their private
property, or attempted to do so, they could argue that they should not
be held criminally liable for the killing. I would argue, however, that
when the Missouri legislature combined the defense of self-defense and
the defense of habitation in 2007, the initial aggressor limitation on the
defense of self-defense became a limitation on the defense of habitation
as well.288 Under my proposal, since the McCloskeys brought their
firearms out of the home and pointed them at the unarmed protestors
or displayed them in a threatening manner, the judge would have to
give an initial aggressor instruction to the jury. The jury would then get
to decide whether they were the initial aggressors.

D.

Possible Objections

In this Section, I address a few possible objections to my
proposal requiring the judge to give an initial aggressor instruction
whenever an individual brings a firearm out in public, displays it in a
threatening manner or points it at another person, is charged with a
crime, and claims self-defense. There are doubtless many other
objections that might be raised, but in the interest of time, I have
addressed only the most salient objections.
1.

Doesn’t this proposal impermissibly shift the burden of
proving self-defense on the defendant in violation of
the defendant’s due process rights?

State v. Lawrence, 569 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (“We find no case in
which the mere breaking of the curtilage is sufficient to support a defense of habitation”).
See also State v. Goodine, 196 S.W.3d 607, 613-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“as used in section
563.036, ‘premises’ is usually understood to constitute the house, or dwelling, and not
broadly to include all of the defender's property”).
286 Pohlman, supra note 281, at 879.
287 Id. at 877-80.
288 I would also argue that the initial aggressor limitation should apply not only to the
defense of self-defense but also to any corollary defenses related to the defense of selfdefense, such as the defense of others or defense of habitation at least when the act of killing
occurs outside the actual dwelling.
285
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One might first object to mandating an initial aggressor
instruction on the ground that this impermissibly shifts the burden of
proving self-defense to the defendant in violation of the defendant’s
due process rights. It does not. If the State places the burden of
disproving self-defense on the prosecution, the burden of disproving
self-defense stays with the prosecution. My second proposal simply
states a triggering condition for an initial aggressor jury instruction.
Moreover, while most states place the burden of disproving
self-defense on the State, there is nothing that prohibits them from
placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant.289 In
Martin v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that States may choose to place
the burden of proving an affirmative defense like self-defense on the
defendant or the government.290 If a state may place the burden of
proving self-defense on the defendant without violating the
Constitution, a state can surely place the lesser burden of disproving
initial aggressor status on the defendant as well. My proposal, however,
does not require the states to place the burden of disproving initial
aggressor status on the defendant. It lets the states decide which party
should bear the burden of proving or disproving initial aggressor
status.291
2.

If an individual has a license to carry in public, is it fair
to require an initial aggressor instruction?

One might also object to mandating an initial aggressor
instruction on the ground that such a mandate would unfairly include
individuals who have obtained a license to carry a firearm in public. It
is true that my second proposal does not recognize an exception for
individuals with a license to carry a firearm in public. Even individuals
with a license to carry would be subject to an initial aggressor
instruction if they bring their firearm out in public, display it in a
threatening manner or point it at another person, are charged with a
crime relating to the use of that firearm and claim self-defense. Having
the right to carry a firearm in public does not mean one has the right to
use that firearm in a manner that causes physical harm or creates a
289

Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1987).
Id.
291 If a state decided to place the burden of disproving initial aggressor status on the
defendant, which is what I would recommend, the standard of proof likely would not be
very high. Most states would probably require the defendant to prove by only a
preponderance of the evidence that she was facing a credible threat of physical harm and
displayed or pointed the firearm to try to avoid a physical confrontation, which is the usual
standard of proof when the defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense.
DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 16.01, at 193 (noting that when a legislature allocates to the
defendant the burden of persuasion regarding a criminal law defense, the defendant “is
usually required to convince the fact finder of his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence”).
290
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reasonable apprehension of such harm. Given the enormity of the
psychological and emotional harms caused by gun violence in addition
to the physical harms suffered by the actual victims of gun violence,292
it is fair to mandate an initial aggressor instruction any time any
individual brings a firearm outside the home and then commits a crime
with it.
It also makes sense to apply an across-the-board rule without
carving out an exception for individuals with a license to carry a firearm
in public because the standards for the granting of a license to carry
vary from state to state. The vast majority of states today “will issue a
concealed carry permit to pretty much any person who applies and
meets their minimal requirements.”293 These states are called “shall
issue” states.294 A handful of states, including New York, have licensing
schemes that require the applicant to show “proper cause” or “good
reason” to carry a firearm in public.295 These states are called “may
issue” states.296 The showing necessary to satisfy the “proper cause”
standard differs in each state so the mere fact that one has a license to
carry does not carry the same meaning the same thing in every state.297
An individual with a license to carry based on “proper cause”
might be able to put forth the granting of that license as some evidence
in support of their claim that they were not an initial aggressor, but the
granting of such a license alone would not be sufficient proof that they
were facing a threat of physical harm at the time that they discharged
their firearm. Proof that they were facing a credible threat of physical

292

Joseph Blocher & Reva B. Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New
Account of Public Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2021) (discussing
the harms to those who witness gun violence and the continuing harm to the families and
friends of victims of gun violence).
293 Brittanica, State-by-State Concealed Carry Permit Laws, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 11, 2022),
https://concealedguns.procon.org/state-by-state-concealed-carry-permit-laws/
(https://perma.cc/DZ29-PW23).
294 Id.
295 Id. (listing California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey and New York as “may issue” states); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Agrees to
Decide Whether Gun Owners Have Right to Carry a Weapon in Public, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-04-26/supreme-court-agrees-todecide-whether-gun-owners-have-right-to-carry-a-weapon-in-public
(https://perma.cc/GK55-5AXQ).
296 Brittanica, supra note 293.
297 In Hawaii, for example, a person applying for a concealed carry license must show (1) an
exceptional case, and (2) reason to fear injury to his or her person or property. Young v.
Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 775 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc), citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a). As
a general rule of substantive criminal law, deadly force is not allowed in defense of personal
property. DRESSLER, supra note 49, § 20.02[B][3] at 248. A person with a concealed carry
license granted on the basis of fear of injury to property has not shown they were facing a
credible threat of physical harm to their person and should be required to make that showing
if they brought a firearm outside the home, pointed it and shot and killed or injured another
person.
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harm at that time and pointed the firearm to try to avoid a physical
confrontation would be needed to escape initial aggressor status.298
It should be noted that this objection will likely become moot if
the Supreme Court rules that New York’s licensing scheme requiring an
individual to show “proper cause” violates the Second Amendment. If
the Court rules this way, the “proper cause” licensing scheme that
currently exists in New York and other states will likely be replaced
with the more permissive “shall issue” licensing regime in which the
State must issue a license to carry a firearm in public to anyone who
applies without requiring any showing of special need. If an individual
obtains a license to carry a firearm in a “shall issue” state, the mere fact
that she had a license would be meaningless in terms of disproving
initial aggressor status because such a license does not require any
showing of need to protect oneself in self-defense.
3.

Why not limit the proposal to those with semiautomatic or automatic weapons?

Another possible objection to the proposal is that it sweeps too
broadly by covering any individual who brings a firearm outside the
home and displays or points it at another person. One objecting on this
ground might argue that the proposal should be limited to those who
bring semi-automatic or automatic weapons outside the home rather
than those with “less harmful” firearms.
One problem with limiting initial aggressor status to those with
semi-automatic or automatic weapons is that such a limitation would
open the door to debate over which weapons should count as
automatic or semi-automatic. Defendants with firearms claiming they
acted in self-defense would try to argue that the firearm they used was
not an automatic or semi-automatic weapon.
This was a problem with the assault weapons ban contained in
the U.S. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
which was in effect from 1994 to 2004.299 The 1994 Act banned certain
semi-automatic firearms that were defined as assault weapons300 but
because the Act defined the term “assault weapons” in a very specific
way, manufacturers were able to slightly modify the firearms they made

298

See supra note 251.
18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1) (making it “unlawful for a person to manufacture, transfer, or
possess a semiautomatic assault weapon”) (expired on September 13, 2004).
300 “The 1994 act defined the phrase ‘semiautomatic assault weapon’ to include 19 named
firearms and copies of those firearms, as well as certain semi-automatic rifles, pistols, and
shotguns with at least two specified characteristics from a list of features.” Assault Weapons
GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/hardwareammunition/assault-weapons/#footnote_7_5603 (https://perma.cc/FN8F-RTPY) (last visited
Dec. 27, 2021).
299
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so they would not fall within the definition.301 As Adam Winkler notes,
one problem with the assault weapons ban contained in the U.S.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which was
in effect from 1994 to 2004 was that it “didn’t ban the sale of every gun
capable of somewhat rapid fire” but instead “attempted to ban the sale
of any semiautomatic rifle that had the menacing military-style
appearance of a machine gun.”302
In proposing a rule that applies to all firearms, I am not
precluding defendants from arguing that the firearm they used was less
harmful or less lethal than other firearms and therefore would not have
created a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. If one is staring
down the barrel of a gun, however, I think one would be apprehensive
of physical harm whether that gun was a semi-automatic firearm or not,
so an argument that one was using just a regular firearm, not a semiautomatic or automatic firearm, would not be that persuasive.
4.

If one has a Second Amendment right to bear arms in
public, doesn’t the proposal infringe upon the exercise
of one’s constitutional rights?

Another possible objection hinges on the outcome of the New
York Pistol & Rifle Association v. Bruen case. If the Supreme Court rules
that individuals have a Second Amendment right to “bear” arms
outside the home, some might argue that the proposals in this Article
would impermissibly infringe on the exercise of one’s Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.
The right to keep and bear arms, however, is not an absolute
right, as even the Heller Court acknowledged.303 This is true of other
constitutional rights as well. For example, even though individuals have
a First Amendment right to free speech, this is not an absolute right.304
301

Assault Weapons, GIFFORDS LAW CENTER, https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gunlaws/policy-areas/hardware-ammunition/assault-weapons/#footnote_7_5603
(https://perma.cc/FN8F-RTPY) (last visited Dec. 27, 2021) (noting that the definition of
“semiautomatic assault weapon” in the 1994 Act “created a loophole that allowed
manufacturers to successfully circumvent the law by making minor modifications to the
weapons they already produced.”).
302 ADAM WINKLER, GUN FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA
38-39 (2013) (noting that the federal assault weapon ban enacted in 1994 “defined assault
weapons largely by their visual characteristics, rather than their lethality”).
303 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, ___ (2008) (“nothing in our opinion should
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms”).
304 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“It is a fundamental principle, long
established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the
Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,
whatever one may choose . . . ”).

66

FIREARMS AND INITIAL AGGRESSORS

67

One has no right to incite others to imminent lawless action.305
Similarly, even though the Bill of Rights guarantees individuals a Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,
this is not an absolute right. The Supreme Court has carved out many
exceptions to the warrant requirement.306
The right to bear a firearm does not include a right to use that
firearm to threaten others. Regardless of whether one has a statutory or
constitutional right to carry a firearm in public, if one uses that firearm
in a way that causes physical or psychological harm to another person,
the question of whether one acted justifiably in self-defense is a
question separate and distinct from the question of whether one had a
statutory or constitutional right to bear arms. Whether one acts
justifiably in self-defense turns on whether one meets the requirements
of self-defense as set forth in the jurisdiction’s self-defense statute and
case law interpreting that statute.
CONCLUSION
As restrictions on carrying guns in public continue to loosen,
the number of individuals bringing firearms out in public is likely to
increase. If gun owners choose to resolve minor disputes in public by
displaying their firearms in a threatening manner or pointing their
firearms at others and end up committing a crime, they should not be
able to hide behind a claim of self-defense. The law of self-defense has
a mechanism—the initial aggressor limitation—that can help discourage
people from pointing guns in public. This mechanism, however, has
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, ___ (1969) (“the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic”).]
306 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the homes of probationers may be
searched without a warrant and probable cause. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)
(upholding warrantless search of probationer’s home under the special needs doctrine);
United States v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (upholding warrantless search of a
probationer’s home based on probationers’ reduced expectations of privacy). The Court has
also upheld warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees. Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843 (2006) (stating that parolees have even fewer expectations of privacy than probationers
because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation). See also Kate Weisburd,
Sentenced to Surveillance, 98 N.C. L. REV. 717, 728 (“With increasing frequency, judges
and prosecutors require defendants to agree to continuous suspicionless searches of their
personal electronic devices and electronic data as a condition of supervision”). In one
opinion, the late Justice Antonin Scalia decried the number of exceptions to the warrant
requirement recognized by the Supreme Court, writing that “one commentator cataloged
nearly 20 such exceptions, including “searches incident to arrest . . . automobile searches . . .
border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent
circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . .
boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport
searches . . . school search[es]. . . .” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, ___ (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
305
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not yet been utilized to its fullest. The initial aggressor limitation can
and should be strengthened in the ways this Article has outlined for the
safety of the nation.
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